University of Massachusetts Boston

ScholarWorks at UMass Boston
Critical and Creative Thinking Capstones
Collection

Critical and Creative Thinking Program

9-1997

Richard Paul, Gloria Anzaluda, and Mestiza
Consciousness: Shifting the Borders of Critical
Thinking
Margaret E. Cronin
University of Massachusetts Boston, mcronin@bucknell.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/cct_capstone
Part of the Women's Studies Commons
Recommended Citation
Cronin, Margaret E., "Richard Paul, Gloria Anzaluda, and Mestiza Consciousness: Shifting the Borders of Critical Thinking" (1997).
Critical and Creative Thinking Capstones Collection. 76.
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/cct_capstone/76

This is brought to you for free and open access by the Critical and Creative Thinking Program at ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Critical and Creative Thinking Capstones Collection by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more
information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu.

RICHARD PAUL, GLORIA ANZALDUA, AND MESTIZA CONSCIOUSNESS:
SHIFTING THE BORDERS OF CRITICAL THINKING

A Thesis Presented
by
MARGARETE. CRONIN

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies, University of Massachusetts Boston, in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
September 1997
Critical and Creative Thinking Program

© 1997 by Margaret E . Cronin

All rights reserved

RICHARD PAUL, GLORIA ANZALDUA, AND MESTIZA CONSCIOUSNESS:
SHIFTING THE BORDERS OF CRITICAL THINKING

A Thesis Presented
by
MARGARETE. CRONIN

Approved as to style and content by:

Delores Gallo, Professor/ Critical and Creative Thinking
Chairperson of Committee

Lawrence Blum, Professor, Philosophy
Member

Delores Gallo, Progr
irector
Critical and Creative Thinking Program

ABSTRACT

RJCHARD PAUL, GLORJA ANZALDUA, AND MESTIZA CONSCIOUSNESS:
SHIFTING THE BORDERS OF CRJTICAL THINKING

September 1997
Margaret E. Cronin, B.A. , Lycoming College
M.A., University of Massachusetts Boston
Directed by Professor Delores Gallo

In recent years, many theorists and practitioners in the field of critical and creative
thinking have moved beyond a discrete skills understanding of critical and creative
thinking to advocate a more holistic approach. This approach focuses on recognizing
underlying assumptions, analyzing frames of reference, and foregrounding personal and
social biases. Yet despite this much needed move toward contextualizing thinking and
the thinker, there is little attention given to the role that power and identity difference
play in the development and teaching of thinking.
This thesis concerns itself with the issues of power, identity, and difference in
thinking by comparing the work of critical thinking theorist Richard Paul with that of
several race-inflected lesbian feminist theorists. I consider what happens if we try to
insert a very specific thinking subject -- Gloria Anzaldua's mestiza thinker -- into Paul's
theoretical milieu.
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inhabiting a multiple consciousness, the mestiza must also deal with the issue of how she
is seen as different from the norm.
This necessitates a discussion of how difference is inflected by unequal power
dynamics that have an effect on how we envision the thinker, how we grant her authority,
and how we define and validate effective thinking. I use critiques of white feminist
theory by Anzaldua, Norma Alarcon, and Maria Lugones to illustrate how some of Paul's
theorizing of the thinking subject parallels white feminist theorizing which has ignored or
devalued women of color in neglecting issues of multiple subjectivity, power, and
difference.
In conclusion, I argue that the critical and creative thinking field would be served
by an inclusion of lesbian/feminist of color discourses. These discourses might serve as
examples of critical and creative thinking, as well as give us a more complete portrait of
the thinker and thinking that goes beyond the notion of the thinker as a universal, unitary
self.
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CHAPTERl
INTRODUCTION

... the link between critical thinking and feminism is much deeper
and potentially more liberating than the current scholarship on critical
thinking would suggest. The aims of each are interrelated and mutually
reinforcing. It may be, then, that critical thinking is not simply a feminist
issue. It may be that critical thinking must be feminist if it is truly to be what
it purports to be, viz., reasonable and reflective activity aimed at deciding
what to do or believe.
--Karen J. Warren, from "Critical Thinking and Feminism" in Re-Thinking
Reason.

In recent years, many theorists and practitioners in the field of critical and creative
thinking have moved beyond a discrete skills understanding of critical and creative
thinking to advocate more holistic, interconnected, complex and deeper approaches to
thinking. Current theorizing and practice focus on recognizing and examining underlying
assumptions, analyzing frames of reference, recognizing and understanding different
paradigms of theorizing, and even attending to personal and social biases (e.g., Richard
Paul's assertion that "strong sense" critical thinking requires an understanding of and
movement beyond "egocentric" and "sociocentric" thinking).
Yet despite this much needed move towards contextualizing thinking and the
thinker, there is little attention given to the role that power and privilege play in the
development and teaching of thinking. While there are pockets of vigorous and
illuminating efforts in critical and creative thinking to put forth a more inclusive,
effective and subtly complex understanding of thinking (Gallo 1989; Walters 1994;
Martin 1993), a discussion of power within the field of critical and creative thinking is
most often absent.
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Neglecting such a discussion has many ramifications regarding canon-formation
and the persons in whom authority is invested in the critical and creative thinking field
(teachers, theorists, writers, and other practitioners). In turn, "who is teaching what
material" affects and effects who ends up in our classrooms and workshops. Recently
here at the University of Massachusetts, we have had discussions on how to make our
program more multiculturally diverse, and how to attract a student body more diverse in
terms of class, race, ethnicity, and open sexual orientation. Our fairly homogeneous
student body is connected to this issue of power, and to the discourses that are used, and
perhaps more importantly, the discourses that are not used, in this interdisciplinary, but
not yet fully multicultural, field of critical and creative thinking.
In order to bring an understanding of power and privilege into the critical and
creative thinking conversation, I would like to compare the work of some lesbian and
women of color feminist theorists with that of critical thinking theorist Richard Paul. I
am particularly interested in looking at the ways in which Richard Paul's
conceptualization of the thinking subject may differ from Gloria Anzaldua's
mestiza/borderdweller portrait of a thinking subject. I believe such an examination of the
thinking subject will help us to see that the way we conceive of the thinker has
implications for how we theorize knowledge formation and how we define good,
effective, or sound critical thinking.
Like many other theorists and thinkers in the critical thinking field, Richard Paul's
work is marked by an insistence that a successful critical thinker must be able to move
between different frameworks of thinking. He delineates two kinds of critical thinking:
weak sense critical thinking and strong sense critical thinking. One way of describing the
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difference between weak and strong sense critical thinking would be to say that the weak
sense critical thinker is stuck in one frame of reference, that her thinking is bound by her
own framework for thinking about a particular thing. Paul suggests that it is quite
possible for the thinker to make intelligent and even sophisticated arguments, and yet not
be thinking deeply because the thinker is confined within a single frame of reference. In
other words, one may invoke rules of logic, create neat, tidy arguments, and come to
reasonable conclusions, but actually not have done much effective thinking because one
has essentially stayed within a narrow point of view.
Paul asserts that truly creative, useful, transformative thinking requires one to step
out of that point of view by investigating and revealing the assumptions that underlie
one's own framework. Furthermore, one must learn to examine and empathize with the
assumptions that inform another person's framework.
Many of us (including myself) in the Critical and Creative Thinking Program
embrace Paul's ideas as sound and useful, especially in terms of their implications for
teaching critical thinking in various institutional education settings.
Yet, as a student, as an educator, and as a critical thinker, I must ask some
questions, questions that we might consider in three clusters. First, given Paul's
exhortations that we must employ multiple frameworks in the practice of strong sense
critical thinking, why does his theorizing still bear the marks of a fairly unexamined
white, formally educated, masculinist, heterosexist voice? Of what significance is it that
an educator so sensitive to the foregrounding of assumptions chooses not to characterize
the particularity and partiality of his own voice as speaker, as a writer? Second, how does
Paul's failure to examine his own voice and particular grounds of identity affect the way
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he imagines "The Thinker" and the steps such a thinker needs to take in order to move
from weak to strong sense critical thinking? Is Paul's image of the universal thinker an
image into which all thinkers can fit? By extension, do all thinkers have a relationship to
egocentricity and sociocentricity similar to the general description that Paul provides?
And third, what part of the thinking picture is missing if Paul is willing to talk about the
role that power plays in forming prejudicial thinking, yet does not discuss the ways in
which cultural, social and institutional contexts can and have created hierarchies in which
certain kinds of thinking and thinkers are given more credibility or authenticity than
others? In other words, what are some of the differences between Paul's view of the
thinker and thinking and other critical theorists who do examine the unequal play of
power over different kinds of thinkers and different kinds of thinking?
The first section of this thesis reviews some of Paul's central concepts, those
briefly characterized above: strong and weak sense critical thinking, and issues of
prejudice, egocentricity, and sociocentricity as obstacles that must be wrestled with if a
thinker is to progress from weak sense to strong sense critical thinking. I then allude to
the dissonance that might occur if we try to insert marginalized identities into Paul's
framework for becoming a strong sense critical thinker, especially in regard to his
formulation of egocentricity and sociocentricity as blocks to effective critical thinking.
Exploring this dissonance leads to questions of Paul's unexamined authorial voice and the
apparent homogeneity of his imagined audience, which reveal a larger shortcoming in
Paul's work: his failure to theorize pedagogy as a practice that operates within the field of
power, and his failure to examine how in such a field, value attaches to difference in
socially constructed, unequal ways.
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The second section of the thesis introduces Gloria Anzaldua's mestiza figure in a
further exploration of what happens when we imagine thinkers as real, specific people
who occupy multiple and marginal identities in particular cultural and institutional
contexts in the United States. Unlike the generalized ideal thinker around whom Paul
builds his theories -- a thinker who apparently inhabits a fairly unified self in a fairly
supportive and stable cultural and institutional setting, and to whom the notion of
"universal" seems quite self-evident (so like himself, after all) -- these other theorists deal
with thinkers whose lived experience gives rise to a self made up of multiple identities, a
self who already lives and thinks within multiple frameworks that are not always neatly
resolved or harmonious or rational. The thinker who inhabits a mestiza consciousness
draws our attention to issues of voice, authority, and audience that inform, but are not
directly discussed, in Paul's formulation of thinking and the thinking subject, which is
more deeply explored in the next section.
In the third section, I further consider the issue of power in thinking by looking at
the ways in which Anzaldua theorizes power and thinking differently than does Paul. I
argue that because of their marginalized identities, Anzaldua and other borderdwellers
such as Audre Lorde, Norma Alarcon, and Maria Lugones understand that critical
thinking requires more than multiple points of view. Because our lives are inscribed and
conscribed by institutional frameworks, different kinds of thinkers are accorded varying
degrees of authority depending on the context in which they do their thinking; hence,
power must be a part of any discussion of thinking.
While the discourse community out of which Anzaldua, Lorde, Alarcon, and
Lugones arise is feminist theory, I think it is instructive to critical thinking theorists such
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as Richard Paul and programs such as ours. In describing their thinking subjectivities,
these feminists question assumptions of white feminist theorizing, some of which are
remarkably similar to unexamined assumptions in Paul's work. The main assumptions I
will be concerned with are the implicit ideas that the thinking subject is unitary, and that
difference does not need to be named and theorized in terms of both particularity and
power. Examining some of the mistakes that white feminists have made in theorizing the
subject of critical consciousness reveals some of the parallel gaps in the work of Richard
Paul and illumines how we might strengthen the Critical and Creative Thinking Program.
The work of Anzaldua, Lorde, Alarcon, and Lugones is marked by a very
conscious attention to power and empowerment in hierarchical, unjust settings, whereas
Paul tends to see power as something available to anyone who will just learn how to be a
strong sense critical thinker. Though Paul does talk about power imbalances that allow
some points of view to get more airtime than others, his fairly stable position as a straight
white educated male blocks his view of his own privilege, and makes it less compelling
for him to attend to his own authorial voice and the possibility and implications of a
heterogeneous as opposed to homogeneous audience. Hence, he more confidently asserts
a belief in objectivity, universality, and Western constructs of rationality than any of the
other critical thinkers herein examined.
In the fourth and final section of the thesis, I contend that if Paul is to fully
actualize his own standards for strong sense critical thinking, he must theorize power and
the thinker in more complex ways so that everyone can get into the building and be heard
in the room where he imagines a truly democratic, critical thinking discourse might take
place. No matter how bent on justice we may presently be, we must remember America's
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very constitution did not extend full citizemy, humanity even, to most of the people
inhabiting the country at the time . Though we have made corrections over time, our
institutions still bear the mark of these founding flaws, and many of our citizens still bear
the injustices remaining in the structural fiber of these institutions. This requires that he -and all of us -- face up to the fact that in imperfect, unjust societies power is divided
unequally, and difference often equals deficient. Because thinkers live inside, not
outside, this unfair set-up, thinking itself is affected by unequal power dynamics.
This is not to say that our thinking need be overly determined by unequal power
dynamics, for it is precisely the meta-analysis the mind is capable of, a meta-analysis
Paul wants to foster, that can move us beyond unequal systems. But we cannot move
beyond what we refuse to see. Comparing Anzaldua's vision of the thinker with Paul's
allows us not only to see several facets of many truths, but to also understand that
multiple viewpoints without an attendant analysis of context and power gives us a false
and incomplete view of the field of opportunity in critical thinking, and thus delimits
thinking itself. The mosaic of voices I bring together here with Paul's offer alternative
visions of the thinker as a continually evolving, sometimes conflicted, but nonetheless
creative self who must continually work at re-assessing and integrating multiple identities
for various purposes and shifting contexts. The idea of the thinking self as a multiple,
fluid entity -- such as the mestiza figure -- is perhaps not as comforting as are stable
formulas or universal descriptions of the thinker as a unitary subject. The strength of the
mestiza figure, however, is that it characterizes the lived experience of most people better
than a lot of traditional ideas about objectivity and universality ever have.
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CHAPTER2
AUTHOR'S CHARACTERIZATION/CONTEXTUALIZATION

Locating the Author

Before proceeding further, let me first locate myself within this discourse and
acknowledge (as far as I can see them) the assumptions undergirding my own thinking
here. I am a white Irish-American lesbian feminist. I was raised working class, but am
formally educated (as a result of my family's hard work, white skin privilege, and some
good fortune) and thus now operate out of a position of middle-class or upper middle
class privilege. I work to overcome the insularity of that privilege, as well as share the
resources and advantages of such privilege, through activist and community work,
through friendship, through spiritual and critical self-reflection, and through my writing
and critical, lesbian-feminist, anti-racist, student-centered pedagogy in various teaching
arenas.
I understand this investigation and responsible re-deployment of privilege to be an
ongoing and always incomplete endeavor. In our hierarchical, profit-driven consumer
culture, it is not improbable to conceptualize power and privilege as functioning like
drugs. In Gender Outlaw, Kate Bornstein, a male-to-female lesbian transsexual writes,
"to have [male privilege] was like taking drugs, to get rid of it was like kicking a habit. I
gave it up because it was destroying me and the people I loved" (Bornstein, 108).
Recovery from addiction to the immediate, albeit short-term or unfulfilling
gratification that marks such power and privilege is a lifetime, daily process. Putting
human and spiritual concerns in the center of one's life, one's community, necessitates a
vigilant evaluation of and painful disentanglement from the profit-driven, materialist,
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convenience oriented, thrill-promising American culture that threatens and seduces us
from a frighteningly wide array of venues. Not to do so, however, dulls our thinking,
stunts our imagination, and jeopardizes not only our integrity, but our quality oflife, and
perhaps even our continued physical existence.
It is my belief that all forms of thinking, creativity, and especially education,
spring from a political frame of reference, however normalized or concealed that frame of
reference may be. Beyond the feminist notion that the personal is political, I understand
everything to be informed by politics. Hence, everything operates within the field of
power, as power is variously and often contradictorily defined, contested, and deployed in
a culture such as ours that claims, but does not yet fully enjoy or even embrace,
democracy.
This understanding of the ubiquitous nature of power dynamics is born of my
experience as a woman and lesbian in a heterosexist society. My own experience of
oppression, developing critical consciousness, and empowerment, as well as my
connection to working class and racial liberatory critical consciousnesses (through
activism, reading, and friendship) vitally informs my particular -- and partial -- view of
the world.
My academic understanding of power, thought and agency is postmodernist in
flavor, though not without a competing romantic sense or desire for modernist certainty
or security in the exhilarating yet disorienting whirlwind of choice, anxiety, urgency,
freedom/oppression and chaos that comprises our American society in the present
moment.
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As we face the turning millennium in a smaller global community, we need ever
more complex yet graspable, sustaining visions and critical consciousnesses that will
support hope and foster agency. The hard, white, one-piece golf ball shell of our world is
now pulled back, revealing the inner core -- the substance -- of our world: tightly wound
multicolored elastic thread, hopelessly/hopefully bound together, its shape and form
dependent on the tension of interconnection, a tension characterized both by
explosiveness and transformative flexibility, a tension the essential nature of which is
mobile, shifting, rather than stationary or static.

Multiple Identities and Power: Inadequacies of Language and Linear Discourse

In accounting for such complexity, I must also acknowledge a difficulty inherent
in the task of talking about the thinker or the self in a way that honors the multiple
identities that one person may inhabit. As Gloria Anzaldua, Audre Lorde and others
remind us, the self cannot be reduced to one singular socio-political identity (AfricanArnerican, gay, female, mother, etc.), nor can a single identity position be isolated for
discrete observation without distorting what it means to walk in the world claiming or
marked by multiple identities. To speak of the simultaneity of identities, to explore the
multiplicity of the postmodern self in the linear, discursive written word is a task fraught
with intellectual, technical, and emotional difficulty.
For the sake of manageable explanation there may be times when I am speaking
of a discrete identity aspect of a thinker, nonetheless realizing that many other identities
simultaneously obtain in this thinker, and not always harmoniously so. For example,
when I identify as a lesbian, I may do so, in part, to combat heterosexual assumptions that
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invisibilize lesbian reality. I see this as a political, oppositional stance. However,
embedded in a claim to lesbian identity is a binary gender system which I may ultimately
reject as restricting. Thus, my claim to lesbian identity is also not oppositional, in that it
supports an oppressive gender code. Politically then, in claiming a lesbian identity I may
be both supporting a progressive agenda (the right to same-sex love), and re-inscribing
the status quo (a strict male/female binary gender system).
Further complicating the identity matrix, I am also "raced" as white. Unlike my
lesbian identity, my whiteness is curiously visible and invisible. It is apparent to the eye,
but in conversation or writing, in referring to myself, it is often not necessary to "mark"
myself as white because "whiteness" is the norm. The socio-political assumption is
reflected in our language, where white people are just "people," and people of color are
"of color": "black," "Asian," "Native American," "Latino," etc. People of color are
adjectively (and often abjectly) defined: they are the qualified, the delineated, the
different, the other, while white people are normalized, naturalized, as just people, as the
standard by which difference is marked (Appiah and Gutmann Frankenberg; Morrison).
And even as I try, in the previous paragraph, to expose such white-centered
assumptions, I may unwittingly perpetuate such assumptions, for a person of color
reading this might say, "When I use the word person or people, I don't just think of white
people. 11 And that same reader may indeed mark me as white. The point I am trying to
make here is that as a white person in America, I grew up with the luxury (and
incompleteness) of being able to think of myself as just a person and not a raced person.
Most people of color in our country have not enjoyed that luxury.
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It is impossible, in writing, to convey the entire web of experience, history,
biology, culture, politics, and power that inform, create, and lay at the disposal of each
person's identity and agency. And yet we must make an attempt to narrate that
complexity and to grapple with its difficulty . Otherwise, we are likely to oversimplify
the thinking self, and reinscribe the notion that we are seamless, unproblematized, unitary
identities, when in fact we are selves who live in many, sometimes conflicting, "identity
points" (Phelan, 70).
A further problem inheres in terms such as "minorities" and "marginal." Though
in common parlance such terms have come to refer to what is not "mainstream" or
"traditional," often the minority is actually a majority in number who nonetheless do not
hold the majority of institutional, financial, or cultural capital. Thus, who or what is
marginal in terms of institutional power may in fact be more common or mainstream in
everyday reality . In "Toward a New Manifest Destiny," the essayist and poet June Jordan
addresses such sleight-of-hand language regarding who is marginal in America:
I have worked here, inside this country, and I have kept my eyes open,
everlastingly. What I see today does not support a media-concocted controversy
where my life or the lives of African-Americans, Native Americans, ChicanoAmericans, Latin-Americans, and Asian-Americans amount to arguable fringe or
freak components of some theoretical netherland. We have become the many
peoples of this nation--nothing less than that. I do not accept that we, American
peoples of color, signify anything optional or dubious or marginal or exotic or
anything in any way less valuable, less necessary, less sacred than white America.
(Jordan, 198)
Similarly, people or cultural ideas and practices that have been termed
"traditional" or "American" often refer to a fairly narrow spectrum of people and practices
in the United States (i.e. , white people, especially men, of the middle or upper class). For
example, I find it odd to hear Native American students or literature referred to as "non-
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traditional," when in fact, Native American cultures comprise some of the oldest
traditions known to this country.
Furthermore, the term "Native American" itself is problematic. The indigenous
people of this continent long precede the appellations "America" and "American." These
are terms originally imposed on the land and people by European conquerors and settlers.
Additionally, despite the fact that the word "native" is meant to denote "indigenous'' in
"Native American," the use of the word "native" has a history that makes me squeamish.
Too often, this word has been used by colonizing powers to dehumanize indigenous
people as a means of justifying conquest, slavery, and economic exploitation. More often
than not, this process of dehumanization through language (and concomitant structures of
institutional power) has been carried out by whites on brown-, yellow-, or redskinned
people.
This thesis offers no solutions to the problems of power, identity, representation,
and authority that are built into our language and into the linear nature of written
discourse. Rather, I see these problems as challenges which any program that is serious
about pedagogy and thinking must face. I would be remiss if I did not name these
tensions, for they are examples of the labyrinthine structures of power and difference that
inform representation of people, culture and thinking. Again, June Jordan's voice is a
clarion call for us to push beyond the myth of American homogeneity:
Shall we submit to ceaseless lies, fantastic misinformation, and fantastic
omissions? Shall we agree to the erasure of our beleaguered, heterogeneous truth?
Shall we embrace traditions of insanity and lose ourselves and the whole real
world? (Jordan, 198)
So often our "heterogeneous truth" -- with all its vibrant, potentially destructive,
potentially creative tension -- is literally not seen, or ignored, by those who do have
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institutional power in education. If a program such as Critical and Creative Thinking
does not provide a venue in which heterogeneity, power, and difference in thinking may
be explored, what program will?

Author's Motives

When I am asking for inclusion of other theories of critical thinking and of other
models of the thinker, sometimes I am doing so because I feel the pain and frustration, the
disempowerment, of not seeing my own experience reflected or valued in our program.
Other times, I am speaking as one who has benefited unfairly from such models of
thinking and thinkers, one who has achieved recognition and praise for "mastering"
methodologies that support my white skin privilege and/or my social privilege. I want to
break complicity with this privilege by naming it as such. In so doing, I hope to better
see and hear other ways of being and thinking that foster the critical and creative potential
of all kinds of people, rather than an elite few. This is an issue of justice, and of my own
emichment. Still other times, I am asking for inclusion of mestiza and other thinkers
because, despite the fact that I have been raised to value whiteness and middle-class
norms, people of color and working class people have been my friends, lovers and
teachers; to see them excluded is painful to me, as well as just plain wrong. Thus, the
motivation for this thesis comes partly out of direct experience of being silenced,
invisible, or not taken seriously, and partly from watching how others who are different
from me are also disempowered. Thus, I am both the person calling for corrective
measures, as well as the person who needs to learn corrective measures, in terms of
theorizing the thinker and thinking. Finally, I know from experience that despite the
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trappings of privilege and the seduction of hierarchical models of power, when any one of
us is diminished, we are all diminished. Audre Lorde wrote movingly about the
connection between power and our many and different selves in the following way:
My fullest concentration of energy is available to me only when I integrate all the
parts of who I am, openly, allowing power from particular sources of my living to
flow back and forth freely through all of my selves, without the restrictions of
externally imposed definition. Only then can I bring myself and my energies as a
whole to the service of those struggles which I embrace as part of my living.
(Lorde, 120-1)
The characteristics that Lorde values in this description -- flux, multiplicity, an
honoring of particularity, tolerance for ambiguity, an internal locus of
definition/evaluation, motion, openness, life-centered service -- are characteristics that I
think should be a part of critical and creative thinking. This thesis is a meditation on
some thinkers and some theories that might create the kind of "power flow" which Audre
Lorde imagined, and which I long for in our program.
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CHAPTER3
RICHARD PAUL AND CRITICAL THINKING

Weak Sense and Strong Sense Critical Thinking

In this section, I will explore some of Richard Paul's central ideas regarding
critical thinking and the critical thinker. Of particular interest are Paul's
conceptualizations of weak and strong sense critical thinking, and his belief that strong
sense critical thinking cannot be achieved without the thinker overcoming two particular
kinds of prejudice or partial consciousness: egocentricity and sociocentricity.
Paul's distinction between weak and strong sense critical thinking is useful as a
demarcation between bullying sophistry and a deeper, more thorough and honest kind of
thinking. Moreover, his concepts of egocentricity and sociocentricity remind us that our
own individual subjectivity and social frameworks can prevent us from seeing multiple
points of view, from entertaining frameworks that are new or alien or distasteful to us, as
well as prevent us from understanding our own frameworks as models rather than truths
or reality.
The work of Richard Paul urges us to develop a metaconsciousness that helps us
become better thinkers by examining the often hidden assumptions or invisible
scaffolding undergirding our own thought. A central point of reference in Paul's
conceptualization of critical thinking is the distinction he draws between weak sense
critical thinking and strong sense critical thinking. Paul summarizes weak sense and
strong sense critical thinkers as follows:
weak sense critical thinkers: 1) those who do not hold themselves or those with
whom they ego-identify to the same intellectual standards to which they hold
"opponents." 2) those who have not learned how to reason empathically within
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points of view or frames ofreference with which they disagree. 3) those who tend
to think monologically. 4) those who do not genuinely accept, though they may
verbally espouse, the values of critical thinking. 5) those who use the intellectual
skills of critical thinking selectively and self-deceptively to foster and serve their
vested interests (at the expense of truth); able to identify flaws in the reasoning of
others and refute them; able to shore up their own beliefs with reasons. (Paul,
668)
strong sense critical thinker: One who is predominately characterized by the
following traits: 1) an ability to question deeply one's own framework of thought;
2) an ability to reconstruct sympathetically and imaginatively the strongest
versions of points of view and frameworks opposed to one's own; and 3) an ability
to reason dialectically (multilogically) in such a way as to determine when one's
own point of view is at its weakest and when an opposing point of view is at its
strongest. (Paul, 666)
In Paul's conceptualization, one of the most telling differences between a weak
and strong sense thinker is the ability to move between points of view in a deep way. A
strong sense critical thinker is able to acknowledge her own framework of thought or
world view so as to move beyond it, not necessarily to abandon it, but to fully see and
consider the frameworks and world views of other thinkers. To this end, Paul instructs us
to overcome prejudices in our own thinking by learning to transcend, as much as is
possible, egocentricity and sociocentricity. In other words, we must be able, through a
kind of meta-analysis, to move beyond thinking that merely supports our individual and
our group self-interests. We must be willing to examine those places in our thinking
where an idea, conclusion, or assumption seems obvious, or natural, or just commonsense, for these are the places where beliefs, prejudices, and habit collude in the
formation of frameworks which are sometimes flawed, and always partial. In uncovering
and foregrounding the assumptions behind our own frames of references, we are better
able to see the incompleteness of our thinking. This then allows for an openness to and
hopefully, curiosity about, other thinkers and their points of view so that critical thinking
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may proceed as a collaborative, dialectic practice, rather than a polarized battle between
thinkers who each believe they possess the ultimate Truth or Knowledge.

Toward Strong Sense Critical Thinking: Identifying Egocentric, Sociocentric, and
Monological Thought

In describing prejudices and self-serving beliefs that impede critical thinking, Paul
articulates two related concepts -- "egocentricity" and "sociocentricity" -- to describe
what he sees to be natural and often unexamined tendencies in human thought. He
defines them as follows:
egocentricity: A tendency to view everything in relationship to oneself; to
confuse immediate perception ... with reality. One's desires, values, and beliefs
(seeming to be self-evidently correct or superior to those of others) are often
uncritically used as the norm of all judgment and experience. (Paul, 646)
sociocentricity: The assumption that one's own social group is inherently and
self-evidently superior to all others. When a group or society sees itself as
superior and so considers its views about the world as correct or as the only
reasonable or justifiable views, and all its actions justified, there is a tendency to
presuppose this superiority in all its thinking and thus to think closemindedly. All
dissent and doubt are considered disloyal, and rejected without consideration.
Few people recognize the sociocentric nature of much of their thought. (Paul,
666)
Two other important concepts in Paul's theory of critical thinking are monological
and multilogical thinking. Monological thinking is "one-dimensional thinking that is
conducted exclusively within one point of view or frame of reference" (Paul, 659),
whereas multilogical thinking "sympathetically enters, considers, and reasons within
multiple points of view" (Paul, 660).
A cornerstone of Paul's analysis is that much of American education for critical
thought takes a monological approach to multilogical issues. Paul asserts that traditional
cognitive psychological studies that feed into education theory "rarely focus on messy
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real-life multilogical problems that cross disciplines" (Paul, 184). Breaking out of
monological thinking requires a vigilant awareness that all thinking occurs within a
framework, and that we must be able to go beyond our own egocentric or sociocentric
framework into the more complex and ambiguous terrain of multilogical thinking.
People cannot begin to think critically until they are able to ascertain the difference
between monological and multilogical problems, and until they can recognize and
transcend their own egocentric and sociocentric thinking:
Teaching for critical thinking in the strong sense is teaching so that students
explicate, understand, and critique their own deepest prejudices, biases and
misconceptions, thereby discovering and contesting their own egocentric and
sociocentric tendencies. Only if we contest our inevitable egocentric and
sociocentric habits of thought can we hope to think in a genuinely rational
fashion. Only dialogical thinking about basic issues that genuinely matter to the
individual provides the kind of practice and skill essential to strong sense critical
thinking. (Paul, 666-7)
This issue of mono- and multilogical thinking is connected to Paul's construct of
weak and strong sense critical thinking:

.,

. .. we distinguish two important senses of critical thinking, a weak sense and a
strong one. Those who think critically only with respect to monological issues
and, as a result, consider multilogical issues with a pronounced monological bias
have merely mastered weak sense critical thinking. They would lack the ability,
and presumably the disposition also, to critique their own most fundamental
categories of thought and analysis. They would, as a result, lack the ability to
enter sympathetically into, and reconstruct, the strongest arguments and reasons
for points of view fundamentally opposed to their own. When their monological
thinking arises from an unconscious commitment to a personal point of view, their
thinking is egocentric; when it arise from an unconscious commitment to a social
or cultural point of view, their thinking is ethnocentric. In either case they think
more or less exclusively within their own frames of reference. (Paul, 184)
Paul goes on to say that to think multilogically, to break out of egocentric and
sociocentric thinking, is to cultivate a "Socratic character" through which one is able
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think beyond simple self-serving strategies. Paul maintains that this Socratic character is
rare in thinkers, subsequently, "most everyday critical thought is egocentric" (Paul, 191).

Imagining the Thinker in Multilogical Terms: Paul's Exclusion of Relevant
Discourses

Paul's assertion that "most everyday critical thought is egocentric," sets up a
masses/elite equation that troubles me. It suggests that special training, rather than life
experience, is the only route to strong sense critical thinking. But even more disturbing is
that this assertion ignores many well-established streams of critical thought which have
developed in response to the egocentricity and sociocentricity that inform Western
patriarchal rationality. When Paul makes such a statement, he is obviously not thinking
about feminist theory, critical race theory, Freirian pedagogy, lesbian philosophy. As I
will later illustrate in subsequent chapters, these are all schools of thought that might
serve as examples of critical thinking that complexify the thinker's relationship to
egocentricity and sociocentricity.
Beyond ignoring these particular strains of critical thought, Paul is not imagining
the thinker in fully multilogical terms. For all his insistence that we must approach
multilogical issues with multilogical tools, his configuration of the critical thinker
remains relatively monological, if not monolithic. For example, he maintains that "[F]ew
adults have experience in reciprocal critical thought, that is, in reasoning within their
antagonists' point of view" (Paul, 189). Paul, as a straight white man whose identity is
the norm by which other identities are judged, does not consider that there are whole
sectors of the American population whose everyday survival depends upon an ability to
"reason within their antagonists' point of view." Because we live in a society in which
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racism, sexism, classism, homophobia are built into its institutions, people "on the
margins" of institutional power must learn how to think like those with power over them
in order to get by. Furthermore, the "antagonist point of view" is often inculcated in a
person on the margins to such an extent that rather than learn how to think like the
antagonist, such a person must instead unlearn the mindset of the oppressor. People on
the margins don't always experience the luxury of holding "vested interests" that are
backed up by institutional power. Often, such people need to excise the internalized
vested interests of their antagonist in order to find out what interests will support their
own thinking and agency in an unsupportive environment.
I am not saying that, for example, a black lesbian is automatically a more
generous or deeper critical thinker than a white man. However, her relationship to the
culture and to traditional critical thought is more vexed than someone who is comfortable
in and supported by the culture and by Western rational traditions. She is not mirrored
but "othered" by traditional discourse on thinking and rationality; she is not represented
but rather fractured or erased by universality. Unless she has completely internalized
white male heterosexist reality, a black lesbian's very positionality cultivates a
multilogical stance in our culture. Critical thinkers thus have something to gain by
paying attention to the discourse of black lesbians and other marginalized thinkers.
In his description of "typical" thinkers, Paul further asserts that "[f]ew [people]
have experience in making the structures of their own thought conscious" (Paul, 189).
Yet people on the margins are often asked to account for their point of view, to justify it,
while the mainstream identities go unchallenged because they are the norm, the standard,
the "natural." For example, there is intense cultural pressure on gay people to explain
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their affectional/sexual desire, to find its source, to figure out the reasons they are gay.
Yet it would seem odd to most of us to ask a straight person, "What do you think caused
your heterosexuality?" Gay people are thus often quite adept at understanding the codes
of heterosexuality. At the same time, they are forced into examining their own desires in
order to know themselves in a society that does not support or reflect them very well, and
in order to try to represent themselves to that society. Issues ofrepresentation are
extremely complicated for everyone. This complexity is particularly salient for those on
the margins, and often engenders sophisticated critical and creative analyses that might
not be required of someone who sees him- or herself as "normal," as a member of the
dominant culture.
This issue of reality and representation runs throughout Paul's work. He
maintains that one of the biggest stumbling blocks to strong-sense critical thinking is the
human tendency to conflate one's perspective, one's framework, with reality. The
assumptions we take for granted, the "givens" that appear self-evident, the information
that seems mere perception rather than conception, are exactly the most important things
to investigate and unpack, for these are the elements of egocentric and sociocentric
thinking:
One manifestation of the irrational mind is to uncritically presuppose the truth of
beliefs and doctrines embedded in social life and values. We intellectually and
affectively absorb common frames of references from the social settings in which
we live. Our interests and purpose find a place within a socially absorbed picture
of the world. We use that picture to test the claims of contesting others. We
imaginatively rehearse situations within portions of that picture. We rarely,
however, describe that picture as a picture, as an image constructed by one social
group as against that of another. We cannot easily place that picture at arm's
length, so to speak, and for a time suspend our acquiescence to it. (Paul, 191)
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I have no argument with Paul's belief that serious critical thinking demands this
ability to see the "picture as a picture." Yet again, I would argue that there are sectors of
the American population who are not "uncritical" of certain "absorbed frames of
references," who know the picture to be a picture because they do not easily fit in the
frame, or because they are cropped from that picture. I am not talking about the odd
philosopher or artist here, but about entire streams of critical and creative discourse that
have come out of the experiences of being "different" in America. There are, to name a
few, such African-American discourses, feminist/womanist discourses, gay/lesbian/
bisexual/transgendered discourses, working-class discourses. Many people who are not
"in" the so-called "traditional" American social picture are in several of the pictures I just
named, so not only do they experience dissonance or invisibility in the white-male
American construct, they embody the harmony and/or discord inherent in occupying
several identity positions. Can we comfortably say of such people that "[they] cannot
easily place that picture at arm's length ... and suspend [their] acquiescence to it?" For
many people in the groups I named above, opposition -- or at least ambivalence -- rather
than acquiescence, is the more typical relationship to supposed shared American beliefs.
I do not wish to imply that a straight white middle class American man has single
or simple affiliations to dominant American frameworks. He too, will have many
intersecting and or conflicting relationships to certain social values. Yet, there may be
things he does not see, as I think is the case with Paul. Because major parts of his
identity have traditionally composed the norm, he can still operate with a more unified
sense of self. Examining his multiplicity would take a conscious effort on his part to look
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at how social and institutional power consolidates his unified self while distorting or
erasing the selves of people on the margins.

Problems With the Idealized Thinker in Paul's Work

As I indicate in my introduction, this thesis addresses a number of inter-related
issues that arise from what I perceive to be a generally white, upper or middle class,
patriarchal bias to the Critical and Creative Thinking canon. I was led into thinking about
these issues by the lack of adequate feminist, lesbian, and people of color representation
in course readings, and by my feeling that even exemplar theorists such as Richard Paul
posit ideas and approaches that did not always fit or work for me as a thinker who
occupies particular stances in the thinking field: white, anti-racist, mixed working/middle
class woman, lesbian intellectual.
Embedded in Paul's writings are unexamined assumptions about the self or the
thinker. Paul does not question the Western concept of rationality that promotes the
unitary self, universality, and the consistent stable subject as the marks of the integrated,
whole, thinking person. Issues of agency, subjectivity, objectivity, the self, along with
matters of personal, collective, and institutional power are important to any discussion of
thinking, yet Paul does not deal with these issues in more than a cursory fashion.
I think the fact that he does not include critical discourses of marginalized people
within the scope of his discussion on critical thinking allows Paul to gloss over such
issues of the self, agency, and power. This is a serious omission because Paul's failure to
acknowledge entire streams of thought -- such as various theories of feminism,
difference, and class -- not only reinforces an oppressive pattern that privileges certain
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voices over others, it compromises his ability to carry out his own ideas for educational
reform and limits his ability to fully imagine the thinker.
Though much of Paul's work is concerned with how we must attend to the
diversity of frameworks and assumptions that undergird all thinking, his approach
nonetheless ignores historical and social structures of power that have historically marked
certain thinkers and certain structures or traditions of thought as rational, normal, or
natural, while relegating others as alternative, marginal, or invisible.
Beyond the populist or democratic merits of mere inclusion of many kinds of
people, it is important that the critical literatures of many peoples and sites be
investigated in our program because it changes the very nature of the make-up of the
thinker, how we imagine and conceive of the thinker. By extension, this changes what
we mean when we say "good" or "strong" or "effective" critical thinking. Simply
including those that have been excluded not only brings more voices to the table, it forces
us to ask questions about the very subject of thinking, because definitions of the thinker
and thinking are for the most part still based on masculinist ways of being in the world.
By masculinist I mean a patriarchal world view, a chauvinist consciousness that

not only privileges a masculine point of view but conflates that point of view with human
experience in general. An example of masculinist language would be the use of
"mankind" and "man" to refer to humankind and human. I use the term "masculinist" as
opposed to "male" purposefully here. I do not conflate masculinist or patriarchal with the
biological male. Being male does not automatically mean one is masculinist or
patriarchal in one's thoughts or actions, nor does being female guarantee that one is not
masculinist or patriarchal in one's thoughts or actions. It may be true, however, that men,
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more than women, raised in a patriarchal culture are more susceptible to buying into and
purveying masculinist ideas, just as the privileging of whiteness in our culture fosters
white supremacist ideas in white people.
This distinction between masculinist and male is important for a couple of
reasons. One reason is to avoid the placement of negative or positive values on the states
of being male or female. Another is to avoid a kind of biological determinism. Being
male does not mean one automatically holds sexist or masculinist views; being female
does not mean one is free of such views. The most important thing I wish to convey is
that I am talking about attitudes and consciousnesses where there is an imbalance of
power backed up by institutions and historical processes that result in supremacist,
oppressive world views.
I agree with Paul that one of the most fruitful endeavors we might undertake as
educators would be to help people acknowledge and step out of egocentric and
sociocentric thinking. However, I feel that Paul's construction of the weak and strong
sense thinker does not get at how different kinds of people in America might have very
complicated relationships to egocentricity and sociocentricity. Though Paul is obviously
very consciously trying to account for difference (the very terms egocentricity and
sociocentricity imply multiple, if insular, perspectives), by acknowledging that everyone
has biases, prejudices, partial world views, there lurks in his writing a notion of a generic
thinker who need only follow certain steps in order to move into strong sense thinking.
Furthermore, one senses vestiges ofrealism in Paul's work: a belief that "truth" is
attainable, that objectivity is possible, that "good thinking" equals a rationality that has
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consistency at its core. Such a rendering of human thought and social relations is at best
uncomplicated, at worst naive or willfully ignorant.
I would like to complicate this portrait of the strong sense thinker and these issues
of egocentricity and sociocentricity by juxtaposing Paul's work with theorists whose
critical thinking happens in very specific marginalized bodies, lives, settings. What I
want to look at here is how Paul's ideas work out by inserting a very specific lesbian
feminist of color "I" as the thinker and non-dominant "we" as the audience here. How do
Paul's notions of egocentricity and sociocentricity consistent rational thought play out for
someone other than a straight white male, someone whose relationship to agency,
subjectivity -- even full citizenship -- is complicated by unequal distribution of power
(economic, legislative, and cultural capital, etc.). We might start by imagining an
audience or thinker different from what Paul seems to imagine.
A movement to a deeper thinking may indeed be "primarily logical and driven by
a commitment to a consistent and fair use of logical principles" (Paul, 230) for those who
are completely or to a large extent supported by the social/political paradigms of a given
culture. But for individuals comprising groups systemically marginalized by the
dominant culture, I think the process may be different, may be primarily experiential and
may perhaps "feel" intuitive.
To illustrate the poor fit between Paul's prescriptions for the betterment of the
generic thinker and the experience of specific, actual thinkers, I will turn, in the following
chapter, to Gloria Anzaldua's theory of the mestiza thinker.
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CHAPTER4
MESTIZA CONSCIOUSNESS AND CRITICAL THINKING

Thinking in the Borderlands: Gloria Anzaldua's Mestiza Consciousness

In her book Borderlands/La Frontera , Gloria Anzaldua uses multiple languages -English, Spanish, tejano -- and multiple forms (poetry and both analytic and lyric prose)
to develop her idea of mestiza consciousness. She uses mestiza to refer to a person who
lives in the interstices of many identities, identities which overlap, which rub against each
other sometimes creatively, sometimes painfully. The mestiza figure is defined not
simply through her multiple identities (in Anzaldua's case, queer, Indian, Mexican,

tejana, woman, working class, to name a few) , but through the process of having to
navigate and integrate several identities, often under conditions that devalue some or all
of those identities.
Writing of her experience as a Mexican/Indian living in an Anglo world,
Anzaldua asserts that she and others like her must learn the codes of two different worlds
or cultural systems in order to survive: ". .. people who inhabit both realities are forced
to live in the interface between the two, forced to become adept at switching modes"
(Anzaldua 1987, 37).
This is not a simple exercise of switching modes horizontally. Because white or
anglo culture is more powerful and claims more legitimacy, the mestiza is forced to live
in the interface of unequal power dynamics that array themselves along a vertical,
hierarchical axis. This has effects ranging from internal (impact on one's self-esteem,
one's identity) to external (what counts as good thinking, as sane, rational behavior in the
public domain). While mode-switching is necessary for survival, the mestiza runs the
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risk of losing or devaluing her home cultural knowledge in order to make it in the
dominant culture:
Like many Indians and Mexicans, I did not deem my psychic experiences
real. I denied their occurrences, and let my inner senses atrophy. I allowed white
rationality to tell me that the existence of the "other world" was mere pagan
superstition. I accepted their reality, the "official" reality of the rational,
reasoning mode which is connected with external reality, ... and is considered the
most developed consciousness--the consciousness of duality. (Anzaldua 1987,
36-7)
Anzaldua's life and work attests to the limits of duality, to a system that says, choose
male or female, white or colored, Indian or Mexican, queer or straight. Being multiply
identified, living on the borderlands, she sees beyond duality, beyond opposites, to a
synthesis or cohabitation that creates a third perspective, something not dissected in two
for analysis, but created new out of multiple experience. In Borderlands/La Frontera,
plurality is not just a political concept, but a descriptor of mestiza existence: "[t]his book .
. . speaks of my existence" (Anzaldua 1987, iii), Anzaldua writes. Her existence in the
geographical, psychological, political and spiritual borderlands is by definition a
pluralistic experience, an experience that puts one at risk, but furthers a development of
consciousness that is unique and multiple:
Living on the borders and in the margins, keeping intact one's shifting and
multiple identity and integrity, is like trying to swim in a new element, an "alien"
element. There is an exhilaration in being a participant in the further evolution of
humankind .... I have the sense that certain "faculties"--notjust in me but in
every border resident, colored or non-colored--and dormant areas of
consciousness are being activated, awakened. (Anzaldua 1987, iii)
Along with this sense of exhilaration, life in the borders also means living with
ambivalence, with conflict. It means the frequent onset of crisis:
Like all people, we [mestizas] perceive the vision of reality that our culture
communicates. Like others having or living in more than one culture, we get
multiple, often opposing messages. The coming together of two self-consistent
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but habitually incompatible frames of references causes un choque, a cultural
collision. (Anzaldua 1987, 78)
And yet, the mestiza is more than a fractured, constantly in crisis being. Her multiple
experience allows her to fuse fragments , to continually create and recreate who she is, to
incorporate the many and the contentious while maintaining a core integrity that comes
from honest process, from cultivating evolution:
That focal point or fulcrum, that juncture where the mestiza stands, is where
phenomena tend to collide. It is where the possibility of uniting all that is
separate occurs. This assembly is not one where severed or separated pieces
merely come together. Nor is it a balancing of opposing powers. In attempting to
work out a synthesis, the self has added a third element which is greater than the
sum of its severed parts. That third element is a new consciousness--a mestiza
consciousness--and though it is a source of intense pain, its energy comes from
continual creative motion that keep breaking down the unitary aspect of each new
paradigm. (Anzaldua 1987, 79-80)
Anzaldua admits that it is hard to explain or analyze the process whereby this
synthesis happens. She is content to simply say, "The work takes place underground -subconsciously. It's work that the soul performs" (Anzaldua 1987, 79). Understanding
borders, she is comfortable with recognizing the limits of rationality; she does not feel the
need to explain all phenomena in order to know it.
Regarding the limits of rationality, Anzaldua resonates with other critical
consciousness educators such as Hemy Giroux (1992). She contends that sole
dependence on such enlightenment rationality has been far from illuminating; rather, it
has kept us in the dark as divided people, fearful of difference in ourselves and in others,
and locked into violence as a way of responding to that fear: "In trying to become
'objective,' Western culture made 'objects' of things and people when it distanced itself
from them, thereby losing 'touch' with them. This dichotomy is the root of all violence"
(Anzaldua 1987, 37).
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Anzaldua uses her writing, her spiritually grounded creativity, to negotiate the
conflict and ambivalence inherent in life in the borderlands. (This is significant, for it is a
relatively new phenomenon in patriarchal history that a woman may voice her life in
language -- as Anzaldua notes in reviewing Mexican/Indian history, "the Indian woman's
only means of protest was wailing" [Anzaldua 1987, 21]). As a critically enfleshed
writer, as a thinker who does not have the privilege of disembodied objectivity, Anzaldua
contemplates the ways in which the very act of writing itself is an exercise in
transformation, in blurring or fusing apparent opposites:
I ponder the ways metaphor and symbol concretize the spirit and
etherealize the body. The Writing is my whole life, it is my obsession. This
vampire which is my talent does not suffer other suitors. Daily I court it, offer my
neck to its teeth. This is the sacrifice that the act of creation requires, a blood
sacrifice. For only through the body, through the pulling of flesh, can the human
soul be transformed. And for images, words, stories to have this transformative
power, they must arise form the human body--flesh and bone--and from the
Earth's body--stone, sky, liquid, soil. This work, these images, piercing tongue or
ear lobes with cactus needles, are my offerings, are my Aztecan blood sacrifices.
(Anzaldua 1987, 75)
There is risk and difficulty in raising issues of the soul, spirit, psyche in an
academic setting, where such issues are, at best, deemed irrelevant. Indeed, a speaker
who raises such issues in the academy may risk undermining her credibility as a scholar
or as a reasonable authority. And yet it would seem that to anyone who has lived deeply
as well as thought deeply, there are mysteries, paradoxes, inexplicable phenomenon
regarding human thought and creativity. To leave these out of the discussion would be
tantamount to saying we only have a fraction of a brain simply because it does not appear
that we utilize all our brain's capacity.
This understanding of lived experience, the experience of the body and soul under

oppressive power dynamics and in self-empowerment, informs the perspective of the
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mestiza. Anzaldua argues that "those who are pushed out of the tribe for being different
are likely to become more sensitized" (1987 , 38). She goes on to describe the
vulnerability, the lack of safety and violence with which such marginalized people must
contend. This is particularly true in institutionalized settings, and often plays itself out
fiercely in schools. But in her favor, the mestiza has a tolerance for ambiguity (in fact,
embodies it) and functions out of a pluralistic mode that relies on both convergent and
divergent thinking.

The Mestiza 's Relationship to Egocentric and Sociocentric Thinking

Given all this, a person with mestiza consciousness may need something very
different than an admonishment to overcome egocentric and sociocentric thinking. And
she may offer those with non-mestiza consciousness some knowledge about how to
stretch, how to be more inclusive, how to transcend the us/them, the me/other duality that
skews power and keeps us all imprisoned in untenable identities.
Since part of learning and growth depend on self-esteem and a position of relative
safety from which to take growth-producing rather than wound-producing risks, would
Paul really want to ask the mestiza student to "overcome" egocentricity or
sociocentricity? What egocentricity and sociocentricity might a white male educator like
Paul need to examine in order to relate meaningfully to a mestiza student? How can the
educational institution configure itself beyond the binary and masculinist white, middle
and upper class paradigm in order to see and hear from those within it whose
consciousnesses go beyond a single sociocentricity? How can we design pedagogies
which support and learn from thinkers who have had to overcome sociocentricity in order
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to survive in a world that demands they know their native culture as well as the culture of
those in economic and political control?
In other words, given the confusion and damaged self-esteem that can be part of
life in the borderlands, and given the privileges held by many people in educational
institutions, what can we as educators offer the mestiza student, before demanding she
work through her "egocentricity" or "sociocentricity"? It may be that we need to create
ways for her to strengthen her ego, to explore her culture in a positive, affirming way
before questioning it. Chances are, given the multiplicity of life in the borderlands, her
questioning will come, if it is not there already. She may need support, not interrogation.

The Mestiza Student Reads Richard Paul -- A Hypothetical Case

Let us entertain an example here. Suppose we have two students in a Critical and
Creative Thinking class. One is a Native American woman named Pauline, the other is
an Irish-American named Thomas. Pauline was born in Arizona and was educated in a
government boarding school. The U.S. government mandated Pauline's attendance at this
school, where she was separated from her family and community for most of the year,
and where her native language was prohibited in favor of Standard English. In her
summers at home however, her grandmother does her best to ensure that Pauline learns of
her people's traditions and beliefs. These traditions and cultural beliefs are transmitted in
oral and communal modes, through story, through ceremony, through observation and
participation in tribal life.
Six months ago, Pauline came out as a lesbian to her family and her community.
Some family members have accepted this news quietly . Others, both in her biological
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family and in her extended kinship community, are distrustful of Pauline's new identity
claim. They suspect that Pauline's lesbianism, like her pursuit of formal education, is
evidence that she is too immersed in "white culture." Here, in her first semester of a
graduate program, Pauline has not come out to anyone at school.
Thomas grew up in a small middle-class town in New Jersey. Most of the
inhabitants of his home-town were Irish Catholic, all of them were white. He was raised
primarily by his mother; his father died in a car accident when Thomas was six. His
small public elementary school reflected the town's demographics -- all white, mostly
Irish American and Catholic. His public high school was bigger, and was seventy percent
white, twenty-five percent African-American, three percent Hispanic, and two percent
Asian. Thomas is heterosexual and engaged to his high school sweetheart.
Let's imagine now, that it is six weeks into the fall semester, and Pauline and
Thomas are in their first course of a graduate program called "Critical and Creative
Thinking." In this course, entitled "Critical Thinking," they have read several chapters in
Richard Paul's Critical Thinking. Pauline and Thomas have been paired up for an in-class
brainstorming session. They are asked to work together for an hour and a half on an
analysis of a court case in which a white lesbian mother was denied custody of her two
children, a boy and a girl, because her sexual preference might adversely affect the
children, and because the court felt the boy needed a male role model in his parenting.
She and her lover have been co-parenting the children for six years. Guardianship of the
children was awarded to the grandparents, who were suing for custody.
Each pair of students has been given a different case or situation on which to
work. The pairs are to first read the case aloud to each other, then do some individual
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writing on their responses and possible biases that might relate to the case. They are
given fifteen minutes for this private brainstorming on paper. Subsequent to this
individual writing, they are to have a conversation with their partner about what they
have written, and help each other identify any possible egocentricity and sociocentricity
in their responses. The teacher tells the class that whatever case or situation you end up
with really does not matter per se.; the case is merely to serve as a jumping off point for
thinkers to get some practice in identifying and stretching the boundaries of their
egocentric and sociocentric points of view.
In conversation with Thomas, Pauline finds herself in a predicament immediately.
He begins their work session by saying, "I can't believe out of all the assignments, we
got stuck with this one." She is not sure what he means by this -- is his comment a
homophobic reaction, or a reaction to the difficulty level he perceives to inhere in the
case they were given? Her uncertainty makes her hesitate.
Thomas takes Pauline's silence to mean that he has the floor. "Okay, here are my
feelings on the subject. I don't really approve of queers, especially fags. The thought of
two guys together turns my stomach. But I guess I think gay people should be able to
love who they want as long as they're not flamboyant about it, and as long as they don't
try to get married or have kids. I think kids need a mom and a dad; I feel I missed out on
a lot by not having a father around for most of my life. I also believe America has the
best legal system in the world, so I think the mother in this case should abide by the
judge's decision. She had her day in court and she lost." Though in class and in
conversation, Thomas often proudly refers to his Irish-Catholic heritage, he does not here
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mention his race or class background as variables that might affect his frame of reference
in considering this case.
As Thomas finishes his last thought and looks at Pauline expectantly, she stares at
the list she has made of her possible egocentric and sociocentric biases. The main points
of her writing are as follows: (1) Her tribe does not conceptualize family in the nuclear
sense. Rather, they operate within a kinship system in which aunts, uncles, grandparents
are as involved -- sometimes more involved -- in the raising of a child as are the
biological parents. Furthermore, kinship designations such as aunt, uncle, grandmother,
and grandfather are not necessarily dependent on blood ties . (2) As a Native American,
her and her people's experience with the United States government and legal system have
not been positive. She does not have faith that justice is the usual outcome when ordinary
citizens, especially if they are poor or not white, have dealings with government
institutions in the United States. (3) Several people in her circle of gay and lesbian
friends are parents. It seems to her that being gay has not compromised their ability to
parent. It does worry her that both the parents and the children have had to deal with
homophobic taunting at school or in the neighborhood. But in some cases, this seems to
have created better communication between the parents and their children, and offered
opportunities for the parents and children to talk about respect for diversity, as well as
how to deal with adversity.
Pauline wonders how much of this list she wants to share with Thomas. She is
angry and a bit scared by his blithe voicing of the words "queers" and "fags" as if they
were interchangeable with "gay." She does not really want to come out to him, and she
wonders if they'll be expected to share all they talked about when the class reconvenes as
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a whole. She feels both embarrassed and angry that she does not share Thomas' s
confidence in the U.S. legal system. If she tried to explain her wariness to Thomas or her
class, she would have to back up her position, and she's not sure she wants to share any of
the painful experiences that have informed her distrust. But if she doesn't recount any of
these experiences, they might think she is paranoid and angry, or too emotional to be
rational.
She decides maybe the safest thing she could talk about is the understanding of
family and kinship with which she was raised. But it is so complicated, she doesn't know
if there will be time to adequately explain it. Plus, some days, she has doubts about her
own understanding of her tribe's customs because so much of her time was spent away
from her tribe in the government boarding school, where a lot of her cultural practices
and beliefs were ignored, maligned, or forbidden. To stall for time, she asks Thomas if
they can look again at Paul's definitions of egocentric and sociocentric thinking. She
finds herself re-reading the following lines over and over:

egocentricity: .. . One's desires, values, and beliefs (seeming to be self-evidently
correct or superior to those of others) are often uncritically used as the norm of all
judgment and experience. (Paul, 646)
sociocentricity: The assumption that one's own social group is inherently and
self-evidently superior to all others. When a group or society sees itself as
superior and so considers its views about the world as correct or as the only
reasonable or justifiable views, and all its actions justified, there is a tendency to
presuppose this superiority in all its thinking and thus to think closemindedly.
(Paul, 666)
These definitions do not help clear Pauline's mind. She wonders how she is supposed to
define her social group, and whose perceptions, values, beliefs she is to overcome in
order to become a "strong-sense" critical thinker. After years of being taught by the
government teachers that her tribal language is not useful, and that her people are
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backward, she is just beginning to understand and reaffirm her native culture through all
the stories she has heard over the years.
It was only recently, in college, that one of her teachers helped Pauline to begin

writing about how torn up inside it had made her to go between the reservation and the
government schools. The government schools sometimes made her ashamed to be Native
American. English did not come easily to her. That, combined with missing her land and
her family, hindered her ability to concentrate and do well in her studies. At home with
her tribe she felt out of sync, distant from her relations because the government school
made her different. Sometimes English words mixed in with her people's tongue; this
seemed to make some of the elders angry or unhappy or sad. For many years now, she
has lived in confusion as to what to believe; she has never felt that her thinking was
superior. She has often questioned her ability to think in an academic setting. She
wonders now, if she belongs in this graduate program. She did well in college, but it took
her seven years to finish. Maybe she should drop this course.
But she is angry, too. Why is she always in the position of having to define and
defend her experience just because it is different from the experience of some white

people? Why is so little of her people's history and literature a part of "standard"
education in a country where her people have lived long before its "settlement" (i.e. ,
conquest) by white people? Why do "family values" usually mean white heterosexual
nuclear family values? Will this supposedly progressive program in Critical and Creative
Thinking deal with these biases, or will she have to be the lone voice raising them in the
classroom, just as she did in college? She doesn't know if she can go through a couple of
more years of that kind of struggle.
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One of the teachers, who has been roving the room to observe student
conversations, notices the relative quiet in Pauline and Thomas's exchange. He sits down
and asks them how they're doing.
Let's stop the action in this example now and consider a few things from the
teacher's perspective. In a situation such as this, it is possible, and maybe not uncommon,
that a student in Pauline's position simply withdraws: from the conversation, from the
assignment, from the teacher, from her classmates, perhaps from the course and even
from school altogether. But let's assume the teacher is lucky for a minute, and Pauline
shows him what she has written.
What should the teacher do here? What training, disposition, attitude, or strategy
might the teacher need here in order to work with both Pauline and Thomas? Are Paul's
descriptions of egocentricity and sociocentricity, along with his insistence that all strong
sense critical thinkers must overcome such obstacles, salient for Pauline and useful for
the teacher? If Pauline follows Paul's mandate to "overcome" her social group's bias, will
her perspective as a Native American find any representation in this classroom? And
what exactly is her social group? All Native Americans? Just her tribe? Lesbians?
Remember that Pauline attended a government school that forbid her native tongue, that
forbid traditional dress and the practice of sacred ritual or the belief in native lore, that
valued written rather than oral modes of communication. Is it thus realistic to think that
Pauline had the luxury of assuming that her "own social group [was] inherently and selfevidently superior to all others .. . and so considers its views about the world as correct
or as the only reasonable or justifiable views" (Paul, 666)? Furthermore, what might the
teacher and other students learn about tolerance for ambiguity and multilogical situations
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from Pauline's thinking process. In a program such as Critical and Creative Thinking,
which has a student pool comprised of so many educators, it would be particularly
important for the teacher to model practices useful and appropriate for students like
Pauline.
Though brief and obviously not exhaustive, this sketch of Pauline in a Critical and
Creative Thinking classroom situation demonstrates the complications a mestiza student
might experience when she runs up against Paul's unproblematized ideal thinker as a
unitary subject. I want to suggest here (and consider in more depth in the following
chapter), that Paul's ideas regarding egocentricity and sociocentricity do not encompass
the full complexity of the mestiza 's multiple and simultaneous thinking identities.
Though Paul honors multiplicity in his belief that we must cultivate multilogical thinking,
and in his belief that we are capable of entertaining multiple points of view by
transcending egocentricity and sociocentricity, he seems to envision the thinker as a
unitary rather than multiple subject. He writes as if there exists an identifiable American
culture to which all citizens can relate, despite the fact that America is made up of several
cultures. Nor does he deal with the fact that different cultures are valued or devalued, and

different people within cultures are valued or devalued, according to race, gender,
ethnicity, ability, and class. Further complicating all of this is Paul's acceptance of
dualistic thinking and his reliance on binary paradigms that value analysis, rationality, at
the expense of the creative and the unresolved.
In the next chapter, I will further explore this issue of the multiple subject as
thinker to illustrate the ways in which difference and power play over the thinking subject
and help determine our definition of effective critical thinking.
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CHAPTERS
MULTIPLE SUBJECTIVITY, DIFFERENCE, POWER, AND THEORIZING

There is difference, and there is power. And who holds the power shall
decide the meaning of difference.
--June Jordan, from "Toward a New Manifest Destiny," in Technical
Difficulties: African-American Notes on the State of the Union.

Having sketched out Gloria Anzaldua's portrait of the thinker as mestiza, I will
now turn to a discussion of how an understanding of multiple subjectivity, difference, and
power might change the way we think about theorizing the critical thinker and critical
thinking. I will do this by looking at how four feminists of color -- Gloria Anzaldua,
Audre Lorde, Norma Alarcon, and Maria Lugones -- problematize issues of difference
and power in theorizing the thinking subject and knowledge formation in relation to white
feminist theorizing. I will then note the ways in which the oversimplifications and
erasures of white feminist theorizing parallel some of the gaps in Paul's characterization
of the thinking subject and of good thinking.

Why Power and Difference Must be Included in Theories of Thinking

In the last chapter, my examination of Gloria Anzaldua's mestiza in
Borderlands/La Frontera calls into question the model of the idealized thinker that many
mainstream critical thinking theorists seem to imagine. In a later essay, the introduction
to the anthology Making Face, Making Soul Hacienda Caras: Creative and Critical
Perspectives by Women of Color, edited by Anzaldua, she asks:
What does being a thinking subject, an intellectual, mean for women-ofcolor from working-class origins? ... It means being in alien territory and
suspicious of the laws and walls. It means being concerned about the ways
knowledges are invented. It means continually challenging institutionalized
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discourses. It means being suspicious of the dominant cultures interpretations of
"our" experience, of the way they "read" us. It means being what Judy Baca terms
"internal exiles." (Anzaldua 1990, xxv)
The thinking subject Anzaldua refers to here cannot avoid dealing with the issue of
difference and power because difference and power affect her daily life. Difference and
power are not simply areas of academic speculation or philosophical inquiry for the

mestiza. Rather, difference and power shape the mestiza's day, body, career. Unlike
Richard Paul, Anzaldua is not able to assume a unitary or universalized character in
regard to her authorial stance, her audience, or her thinking subjectivity. Nor can she
assume that her thinking will be taken seriously as sound, logical, or as constitutive of
theory, because of the way in which difference is otherized and devalued.
In her 1980 essay, "Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference,"
Audre Lorde wrote: "As a forty-nine-year-old Black lesbian feminist socialist mother of
two, including one boy, and a member of an interracial couple, I usually find myself a
part of some group defined as other, deviant, inferior, or just plain wrong" (Lorde, 114).
Both Lorde and Anzaldua are seen as deviant or wrong for a couple of reasons. One has
to do with the particularities of some of their identities, the other has to do with their
insistence on the simultaneity of multiple identities.
Let's look first at the particularities issue. In a society where heterosexuality and
whiteness are normalized, Lorde's and Anzaldua's "different" lesbian orientation and their
"different" skin color are "deviant." The fact that difference so easily elides into deviance
points to the negative values that adhere to certain racial, economic and social differences
in American culture. The second way in which Lorde and Anzaldua might be seen as
deviant or deficient by theorists who believe in universality and objectivity has to do with
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Lorde's and Anzaldua's refusal to choose one identity over the other, or to resolve their
several identities into the Western myth of the unitary self.
Because she is many identities in a society that valorizes the unitary self and also
devalues certain identities (women, queers, people of color, poor people), the mestiza is
often in a state of inner and outer conflict. As noted in the previous chapter, this state of
conflict engenders both crisis and creative tension in the body and consciousness of the

mestiza. Much of the crisis comes from external and sometimes internalized pressures to
choose one identity over the other, to resolve the several aspects of her identity into a
unitary identity, the Western model of the individual self.
People like Lorde and Anzaldua cannot sanguinely operate in a dualistic
framework that asks them to be hyphenated people: African-American, or MexicanAmerican. For one thing, such a designation does not take into account other aspects of
their identity (lesbian, working class, women, etc.). And for another, such hyphenated
designations, in American culture, do not give equal weight to the identities they invoke.
"American" becomes the operative descriptor, the noun, which is modified by the
adjective "African" or "Mexican." Thus, what we end up with is what Maria Lugones, in
her essay "On Borderlands/La Frontera: An Interpretive Essay," describes as a "dual
personality" rather than a "plural personality":
Because I think it is important to distinguish this dual personality from the
plural personality and the operating in a pluralistic mode of the new mestiza, I will
venture my own sense of the distinction. . . . The dual, hyphenated, personality is
an Anglo creation. According to this concept, there is no hybrid cultural self. It is
part of the Anglo imagination that we can keep our culture and assimilate, a
position that would be contradictory if both cultures were understood as informing
the "real" fabric of everyday life. But in thinking of a Mexican-American, the
Anglo imagination construes "Mexican" as the name for a superexploitable being
who is a practitioner of a superfluous, ornamental, culture. Being "American" is
what supposedly gives us (dubious) membership in that "real" culture, the culture
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of the ideally culturally-unified-through-assimilation polis illegitimately called
"America." Being American is what makes us functioning citizens. (Lugones
1992, 35)
The expectation of assimilation is one of the most demanding, complicated and
deleterious pressures that bears down upon people of color and other borderdwellers. As
Lugones notes, this pressure to assimilate derives energy from two powerful cultural
forces . One is the Western ideal of the unitary subject, while the other has to do with the
white, patriarchal, heterosexist paiiicularities that inform the normative category of
"universal man." This refusal to let go of the unitary subject, along with the flattening
out of difference that occurs when "universal" is equated with white, heterosexual male
specificity prevents the "cultural cross-pollinization" that Anzaldua characterizes as a
strength of the mestiza consciousness. Lugones elaborates on the limitations of the dualpersonality construct that arises from a belief in the unitary subject, and points to the
dynamic power of the plural personality actualized in mestiza experience:
The Mexican and the American in the dual-personality construct are both
animated from the outside; that is why there is no cultural "cross-pollinization."
But the plurality of the new mestiza is anchored in the borders, in that space where
critique, rupture, and hybridization take place. Though she cannot choose not to
be read, constructed, with a logic of hyphenation, demoralization, instrumentality,
stereotyping, and devaluation, she can imbue that person with a sense of
conflicted subjectivity and ambiguity. So the dual, hyphenated, personality is
externally animated and characterized by an absence of the ability to respond and
create. The plural personality of the new mestiza is a self-critical, self-animated
plurality. (Lugones 1992, 3 5)
We can see how this dynamic mode of thinking in the borders might invoke and
complicate Richard Paul's construction of egocentric and sociocentric thinking. Instead
of compartmentalization, we have a continuing process of integration that is open and
unfinished and has meaning in its doing, not its completion. The dual or hyphenated
personality is split, neutered, as opposed to the symbiosis or the adaptive regeneration of
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the hybrid. The dynamic possibility of flux and rupture is both the pain and the power of
mestiza liminality.
It is precisely this risk and richness inherent in mestiza liminality that can enhance

our understanding of the thinking subject, and raise questions about how we theorize
thinking itself. I will first deal with the question of what it means for the woman-of-color
to be a thinking subject in territory that has been the domain of a unitary, universalized
thinking subject derived from white masculinist consciousness. Following that, I will
turn to a discussion of how theory has been defined in much the same way, and how
mestiza theorizing could change the way we think of theorizing.

Woman of Color as Thinking Subject: Multiplicity, Difference, Power

In 1981, Gloria Anzaldua and Cherrie Moraga co-edited an anthology entitled
This Bridge Called My Back: Writings By Radical Women of Color. Frustrated with
the absence and marginalization of women of color in feminist discourse, Anzaldua and
Moraga conceived of an anthology that would put women of color at the center of
feminist theorizing. A major assumption informing This Bridge is the belief that if
feminism is to succeed, women of color must be able to name and honor their differences.
Concomitantly, white women must learn to see and honor these differences. A second
informing principle of this volume is that we all must acknowledge the ways in which
power in our culture is unevenly attached to certain differences, such as gender and race,
and in fact, affects the way we perceive difference and grant authority.
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Feminists of color challenge white feminist assumptions of knowledge formation and the
thinking sub;ect.

In her 1990 essay, "The Theoretical Subject(s) of This Bridge Called My Back
and Anglo-American Feminism," Norma Alarcon, one of the contributors to This Bridge,
explores how Anzaldua's and Moraga's anthology challenged received notions of
knowledge formation and the thinking subject which mainstream feminism took for
granted:
the editors and contributors believed they were developing a theory of subjectivity
and culture that would demonstrate the considerable differences between them
and Anglo-American women, as well as between them and Anglo-European men
and men of their own culture. As speaking subjects of a new discursive
formation, many of Bridge's writers were aware of the displacement of their
subjectivity across a multiplicity of discourses: feminist/lesbian, nationalist,
racial, socioeconomic, historical, etc. The peculiarity of their displacement
implies a multiplicity of positions from which they are driven to grasp or
understand themselves and their relations with the real, in the Althusserian sense
of the word. (Alarcon, 356)
Alarcon argues that white feminists have not been able to hear or learn from
women of color because most white feminists have an allegiance to the unitary subject.
Such an allegiance prevents one from truly accepting the multiply identified subject and
the many differences which inform that subject. White feminists momentarily see the
differences between themselves and women of color, only to subsume such differences
under the rubric of "woman" (Alarcon). This impulse towards unity, towards
universalizing, functions as a totalizing maneuver in which difference, and the power
inflecting difference, is erased. As a result, the norm for woman remains "white" woman.
As Alarcon puts it, "[t]he difference is handed over with one hand and taken away with
the other" (Alarcon, 364).
Citing postmodern feminist theorist Jane Flax, Alarcon says that feminism
has not problematized the subject of knowledge and her complicity with the
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notion of consciousness as "synthetic unificatory power, the center and active
point of organization of representations determining their concatenation." The
subject (and object) of knowledge is now a woman, but the inherited view of
consciousness has not been questioned at all. As a result, some Anglo-American
feminist subjects of consciousness have tended to become a parody of the
masculine subject of consciousness, thus revealing their ethnocentric liberal
underpinnings . (Alarcon, 357)
In order to problematize the subject of knowledge, we must be aware of such an
inheritance. Furthermore, we must be aware of the fact that subjectivity and
consciousness are formed in large part by linguistic conventions and institutional
processes which ignore, marginalize, or dehumanize women and people of color. Such
conventions and processes are not likely to recognize or foster the subjectivity of women
of color:
Bridge leads us to understand that the silence and silencing of people begins with
the dominating enforcement of linguistic conventions, the resistance to relational
dialogues, as well as the disenablement of peoples by outlawing their forms of
speech. Anglo-American feminist theory assumes a speaking subject who is an
autonomous, self-conscious individual woman. Such a theory does not discuss
the linguistic status of the person. It takes for granted the linguistic status which
founds subjectivity. In this way it appropriates woman/women for itself, and
turns its work into a theoretical project within which the rest of us are compelled
to 'fit.' By 'forgetting' or refusing to take into account that we are culturally
constituted in and through language in complex ways and not just engendered in a
homogeneous situation, the Anglo-American subject of consciousness cannot
come to terms with her (his) own class-biased ethnocentrism. (Alarcon, 363-4)
What anthologies like This Bridge and characterizations such as the mestiza
thinker can offer us then, is a not only a multiple subject but a decentered subject in
which critical thinking is dependent on more than just the self. In Anzaldua's
borderdweller formulation, critical thinking depends upon a dialogic process within the
many-selved thinking subject and within/between the many communities and discourses
from which such a thinking subject arises and with which she engages.
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This emphasis on the multiple self and the necessity of relational thinking
between many selves and communities (as opposed to knowledge originating with and
authorized by the unitary self) can be seen in Kate Rushin's "The Bridge Poem," which
introduced This Bridge Called My Back, and which has since served as an anthem of selfdetermination for women of color who are sick of the one-way street they experience in
educating their oppressors:
The Bridge Poem
I've had enough
I'm sick of seeing and touching
Both sides of things
Sick of being the damn bridge for everybody

Find another connection to the rest of the world
Find something else to make you legitimate
Find another way to be political and hip
I will not be the bridge to your womanhood
Your manhood
Your human-ness

Nobody
Can talk to anybody
Without me
Right?

I'm sick of reminding you not to
Close off too tight for too long

I explain my mother to my father my father to
my little sister
My little sister to my brother my brother to the
white feminists
The white feminists to the Black church folks the
Black church folks
To the ex-hippies the ex-hippies to the Black
separatists the
Black separatists to the artists the artists to my
friends' parents . ..

I'm sick of mediating with your worst self
On behalf of your better selves
I am sick
Of having to remind you
To breathe
Before you suffocate
Your own fool self
Forget it
Stretch or drown
Evolve or die

Then
I've got to explain myself
To everybody

The bridge I must be
Is the bridge to my own power
I must translate
My own fears
Mediate
My own weaknesses

I do more translating
Than the Gawdamn U.N .
Forget it
I'm sick of it
I'm sick of filling in your gaps
Sick of being your insurance against
The isolation of your self-imposed limitations
Sick of being the crazy at your holiday dinners
Sick of being the odd one at your Sunday Brunches
Sick of being the sole Black friend to 34
individual white people

I must be the bridge to nowhere
But my true self
And then
I will be useful
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Commenting on Rushin's poem and This Bridge Called My Back, Alarcon has this to say
about differences in consciousness, subjectivity, and knowledge formation as they pertain
to white women and women of color:
The speaker's perception that the "self'' is multiple and its reduction harmful,
gives emphasis to the relationality between one's selves and those of others as an
ongoing process of struggle, effort and tension. Indeed, in this poem, the better
"bridging self'' of the speaker is defeated by the overriding notion of the unitary
subject of knowledge and consciousness so prevalent in Anglo-American culture.
Consciousness as a site of multiple voicings is the theoretical subject, par
excellence, of Bridge. Concomitantly, these voicings (or thematic threads) are
not viewed as necessarily originating with the subject, but as discourses that
transverse consciousness and which the subject must struggle with constantly.
(Alarcon, 365)
Until we let go of this idea of the subject as unitary, there is little room for us to see and
examine difference, and therefore, little room for women of color in traditional feminist
discourse.
Similarly, as long as Richard Paul and other theorists in the critical thinking field
neglect to problematize the thinking subject and thereby rely on the unitary subject as the
default model of a thinker, there will not be room for much more than white, male,
middle class identified thinkers in our program. Furthermore, this will prevent Paul from
realizing his own goals, for the unitary subject as thinker automatically excludes models
of thinking such as that embodied by the mestiza.

The "mythical norm. " difference. and value.
Richard Paul's work, and indeed virtually all the literature in our program, stresses
that effective critical thinking requires an analysis of multiple perspectives, world views,
and frameworks . In this way, Paul and theories of critical and creative thinking value
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difference and divergent thinking . What is often missing, however is an analysis of how
difference is defined in relation to accepted norms, and how, as a result, particular
differences are accorded more value than others.
In "Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference," Audre Lorde,
speaking as a black lesbian, talks about how power is connected to a "norm" that does not
represent her, but is actually particular to certain kinds of people in our society:
Somewhere, on the edge of consciousness, there is what I call a mythical
norm, which each one of us within our hearts knows "that is not me." In america,
this norm is usually defined as white, thin, male, young, heterosexual, christian,
and financially secure. It is within this mythical norm that the trappings of power
reside within this society. (Lorde, 116)
Here we see Lorde exposing this norm as mythical. Despite the fact that such a norm
contains certain class, race, and gender particularities, it gains and consolidates power
through institutionally sanctioned assertions of objectivity and universality that are not
always easy to see or unravel, especially for those whose experience match the norm. To
such a person, the norm seems natural, self-evident. This norm is so insidiously
pervasive that Paul can write a six hundred and seventy page book on critical thinking
and never once identify himself as white or male. In contrast, Audre Lorde must fight
being subsumed or erased by this norm by constantly delineating her particular, and
multiple, identities:
As a forty-nine-year-old Black lesbian feminist socialist mother of two,
including one boy, and a member of an interracial couple, I usually find myself a
part of some group defined as other, deviant, inferior, or just plain wrong. (Lorde,
114)
Lorde's experience illustrates the "otherizing" effect operative in defining
difference in our society. Because of the "mythical norm," many identity differences are
not just differences in kind, but in quality. The "mythical norm," parading as
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universality, becomes the model of subjectivity, of thinking consciousness. The extent to
which this model of subjectivity becomes normalized and even naturalized determines the
extent to which different "others" are subjected to that norm, and thereby objectified or
erased. In this way, universalizing voices and narratives create false harmonies that are
oppressive to those not in the "mythical norm," while elevating a small minority's
experience to that of Everyman, to Reality . In order to discern this kind of discursive,
naturalizing process, a theorist must acknowledge that defining norms and difference
takes place within a field of power outside of which it is impossible to stand. If a theorist
resists this acknowledgment through a belief in objectivity as an ideal, or by advocating
the neutrality of reason as it plays over difference, the use of multiple perspectives
resolves into a framework that may well reinforce the "mythical norm."

Emotion in thinking.
Furthermore, in situations informed by power and oppression, the resulting pain,
anger, guilt, and privilege that affect our thinking cannot be addressed through reason
alone. In her introduction to Making Face, Making Soul, Anzaldua declares objectivity
to be of limited use in the critical and creative thinking of women of color and other
borderdwellers:
The anthology is meant to engage the reader's total person. I do not
believe that "distance" and "objectivity" alone help us come to terms with our
issues. Distancing cannot be a major strategy--only a temporary breather. Total
feeling and emotional immersion, the shocking drench of guilt or anger or
frustration, wakes us up to some of our realities. The pieces in this book awaken
the emotions--our emotional bodies "take in" and process the whole spectrum of
states of consciousness from waking and dreaming. The intellect needs the guts
and adrenaline that horrific suffering and anger, evoked by some of the pieces,
catapult us into. Only when all the charged feelings are unearthed can we get
down to "the work," la tarea, nuestro trabajo--changing culture and all its
oppressive interlocking machinations. (Anzaldua 1990, xviii)
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This focus on the body and the emotional realm, so prevalent in the work of Anzaldua
and others who resonate with her mestiza thinker, is missing from a lot of mainstream
models of thinking and intelligence. This is due, in part, to the way in which mainstream
models of the thinker are constructed. The body of the typical ideal thinker is
"unmarked": maleness and whiteness are at once given and invisible. This (white, male)
thinker's status as a subject is not contested or maligned; thus his body is not the
battlefield of distortion or ambiguity that the body of a mestiza lesbian might be. His
gender and color, his body and consciousness, are the standard, and the standard does not
have to justify or even notice itself. Anything other is different, notable, marked by
difference in a way that is not equal to the standard.
Audre Lorde asserts that when we as a society ignore or distort difference in this
way, we limit our capacity for effective thinking in that we fail "to develop tools for using
human difference as a springboard for creative change within our lives" (Lorde, 116). I
believe the focus on feeling and on the body, as well as the mind, as sites of meaningmaking and intelligence, is one of the springboards for creative change in critical thinking
that mestiza theorizing offers.

The mestiza. empathy, and multilogical thinking.
Nor is it just the lesbian, the mestiza, the borderdweller, or other marginalized
people who need theories of thinking that utilize emotional and embodied experience. In
fact, I would argue that what is likely to compel many ofus who are supported by the
"mythical norm" to question that norm and really "see" the perspectives of others has to
do with emotions. The emotion might be pain or guilt sustained by what our privileges
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cost others; it might be an empathic impulse born out of love, friendship , or a desire for
justice; it might be the frustration or fear we experience when we come face to face with
the anger of those whose differences we have not seen, understood, or honored. It might
be a combination of all the above. But whatever the combination, the source of
dissonance that could prompt a person with some mainstream privilege to investigate that
privilege might be, in large part, experiential and emotional as well as intellectual and
rational. I think it is rare that a person is compelled to see and revise his or her privilege
through rational argument alone; I would contend that rational argument is insufficient by
itself in the long thinking journey that revising racist, sexist, classist, or homophobic
attitudes requires.
Indeed, Delores Gallo's work on affect and empathy indicate that emotion, and
especially empathy, are intimately linked to a thinker's ability to think multilogically and
to revise deeply held received knowledge structures that impede critical judgment,
openness, and imaginative thinking (and which often function to reinforce ego and
sociocentric thinking). In "Educating for Empathy, Reason, and Imagination," she
establishes a correlation between empathy and critical thinking and details some of the
educational implications of this correlation as follows:
First, [the correlation between empathy and critical thinking] reveals that
an affective component can have a positive effect on both rational and imaginative
thought. Second, it suggests that empathy is the emotion of affective disposition
to cultivate, since it develops emotional range, which is essential to multiple
perspective-taking and genuine open-mindedness. (Gallo, 59)
Gallo goes on to identify role-taking as an important teaching tool in the
cultivation of empathy and critical thinking. My experience as a learner and as an
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educator is that such role-taking is indeed crucial to the development of empathy and
multilogical thinking.
I would like to add that any discussion of critical and creative thinking could use
the work of borderdwellers such as Anzaldua, Lorde, Lugones, and Alarcon in at least
two ways. In the first place, the way these theorists describe the thinking subject can
stand as a model of a thinker who draws on affect, empathy, and multiple perspectives,
along with reason, in the development of her critical consciousness. Second, reading and
listening to the experience of these thinkers would create more powerful role-taking
experiences in the classroom. For white students, for male students, for straight students,
these theorists provide details of realities that are often missing in the classroom or in
disciplinary canons. For women students, students of color, and gay students, inclusion
of these theorists would create space in the classroom for their often neglected points of
view, which can lead to greater and more diverse classroom participation. The more
identities and perspectives that are sanctioned by full and complex models of the thinker,
the more inclusive and powerful our models of thinking will be. Having reflected on
difference, power, and multiple identity in the thinker, I will now discuss some of the

implications that difference, power, and multiple identity have for theorizing and
thinking.

Understanding Difference and Power: Implications for Theory

In Borderlands/La Frontera, Anzaldua described for us the characteristics of the
new mestiza thinker: she lives in the interstices of many cultures, she inhabits multiple
identities, she values spiritual, emotional, physical knowledge as well as rational
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knowledge, she is familiar with ambiguity and sees the productive possibilities of that
ambiguity.

The authorial "J" and the audience "we" in mestiza theorizing.
In her anthology, Making Face, Making Soul, Anzaldua addresses the issue of
mestiza grounded theory as it relates "traditional" modes of theorizing in the academy:
What is considered theory in the dominant academic community is not
necessarily what counts as theory for women-of-color. ... We need teorias that
will reflect what goes on between inner, outer and peripheral ''I''s within a person
and between the personal ''I''s and the collective "we" of our ethnic communities.
Necesitamos teorias that will rewrite history using race, class, gender, and
ethnicity as categories of analysis, theories that cross borders, that blur
boundaries--new kinds of theories with new theorizing methods. We need
theories that will point out ways to maneuver between our particular experiences
and the necessity of forming our own categories and theoretical models for the
patterns we uncover. We need theories that examine the implications of situations
and look at what's behind them. And we need to find practical application for
those theories. (Anzaldua 1990, xxv-xxvi)
Here, in her introduction to Making Face, Making Soul, Anzaldua is concerned
with creating and validating theories that reflect the reality and support the creative
potential of the new mestiza and other borderdwellers like her. Anzaldua points to the
experience of many women of color in the academy who are silenced or oppressed by
standards of scholarship and theorizing that contain unexamined racism, patriarchal
privilege, and class bias:
[M]any mujeres-of-color in graduate school [feel] oppressed and violated by the
rhetoric of dominant ideology, a rhetoric disguised as good "scholarship" by
teachers who are unaware of its race, class, and gender "blank spots." It is a
rhetoric that presents its conjectures as universal truths while concealing its
patriarchal privilege and posture. It is a rhetoric riddled with ideologies of
Racism which hush our voices so that we cannot articulate our victimization.
(Anzaldua 1990, xxiii)
Rather than try to assimilate or fit into the rhetoric of mainstream theorizing, Anzaldua is
interested in naming the ways in which women of color, lesbians, working class women
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of color theorize, and how such theorizing might change institutional theorizing space
that is so often closed or damaging to non-mainstream people:
Theory, then, is a set of knowledges. Some of these knowledges have been kept
from us--entry into some professions and academia denied us. Because we are not
allowed to enter discourse, because we are often disqualified and excluded from
it, because what passes for theory these days is forbidden territory for us, it is vital
that we occupy theorizing space, that we not allow whitemen and women solely to
occupy it. By bringing in our own approaches and methodologies, we transform
the theorizing space. (Anzaldua 1990, xxv)
In regard to critical thinking, I am concerned with three ways in which women of
color, new mestizas, and borderdwellers transform the theorizing space: (1) through their
understanding of difference, (2) through their understanding of how power informs
difference, and (3) through their understanding of the thinker as multiple rather than
unitary . Overarching all of this is an understanding of the ways in which all of these
three things -- difference, power, and multiple identity--are connected to thinking and
theorizing.

Maria Lugones on difference and the logic of theorizing.
In her essay "On the Logic of Pluralist Feminism," Maria Lugones deals with the
interrelatedness of these three issues and argues "that the logic of all theorizing is affected
by a recognition of difference (Lugones 1991, 37). Lugones asserts that most white
feminist theorists have gotten to the point of seeing what she calls "the problem of
difference," but not to the point of truly seeing difference, because they don't really
"notice" women of color. Lugones suggests that since the emphasis on theorizing is
toward generalizing, and since white women don't really see women of color, they tend to
theorize "as if all women are the same" (Lugones 1991, 40). She goes on to say, "one can
try to explain away this lack of noticing in many ways related to the received
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methodologies, but if white women theorists had noticed us, they would have rejected the
methodologies" (Lugones 1991 , 40). In trying to account for how this could come about,
i.e., how white feminists could see "the problem of difference" yet not notice women of
color, Lugones turns to Elizabeth Spelman's powerful example of one of the ways in
which whiteness is a ubiquitous but hidden normative organizing principle in American
society. Spelman says that white people are schooled in
boomerang perception: I look at you and come right back to myself. In the
United States white children like me got early training in boomerang perception
when we were told by well-meaning white adults that Black people were just like
us--never, however, that we were just like Blacks. (Spelman, 12)
Lugones argues that not only does this keep the white theorist at the center, but it allows
her to keep white theorizing at the center. Rather than explore difference (and thereby
notice women of color) white theorists formulate difference as a problem because white
theorists are more concerned with keeping their theories intact than looking at how their
theories dismantle or erase women of color:
In naming the problem of difference as such, white theorists place the theory at
center: what damages the theory, rather than how their theory damaged women of
color. Thus the attempted solutions to the "problem of difference" try to rescue
feminist theorizing from several possible pitfalls that would render it false, trivial,
weak, and so on. The focus of the solutions is on how to generalize without being
guilty of false inclusion. The solutions seem incorrect to me because they are
addressing the wrong problem. (Lugones 1991 , 41)
Because the primary engagement here is with the theory, rather than the women of
color who raise objections to the theory, Lugones names the white feminists' response
"noninteractive." Confronted with difference, white feminist theorists return to the
theories, and try to resolve difference into that theory, rather than engage women of color,
or recognize women of color theorizing and try to fit themselves into the models that
women of color describe. This boomerang perception has implications in the territory of
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theory because how we theorize people or groups of people affects both description and
prescription, thus it affects people's lives:
Most of the time what the theory proposes is not just a description of a
particular practice or a particular construction or reconstruction of people. Most
of the time a prescription is included. But a prescription for whom? How is one
who lies outside the limits to correct the prescription? How is one to tell that the
discourse that produced this prescription is friendly to oneself? Who is the author
in her own eyes with respect to us? Who is the author in our eyes? Who are we
in the author's eyes? Why does the author think that all we need to do is to correct
the prescription? Why does the author just leave us to write another paper on the
subject, but one that is dependent on hers even though she does not really
acknowledge us? Why does she think she is justified in doing that? Why doesn't
she realize that what she is doing is exercising authority and that the authority she
would exercise, if we are not careful, is authority over us? (Lugones 1991, 39)
Lugones' characterization of theory as a prescription is rich and layered in many ways. I
want to join Lugones here by emphasizing that theory is a lens by which we see a person
or a group, and a vision of where we see that person going, or how she might grow.
Theory affects our perception and conception of what a woman is, of what a person is, of
what a thinking subject is.
Lugones sees the answer to the above-quoted list of questions as related. White
women feminists do not acknowledge women of color, and are not careful about the
authority and privilege they exercise over women of color, because white women fear the
multiple subject. If white feminists truly notice women of color, they must acknowledge
the multiple subjectivity not only of women of color but of themselves as well.
Lugones speculates that this multiplicitous self frightens white feminist theorists
in at least three ways. The first is simply that multiple subjectivity itself may be scary for
those who are used to operating as a unitary subject. Second, the multiple subjectivity of
women of color demonstrates that white women, too, are many-selved, and that some of
the selves we animate in our interaction with women of color are selves we may not want
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to look at because they are duplicitous in nature. Third, if white women truly see that
women of color are comprised of many selves, they will have to face that not all those
selves put white women at the center. White feminists may be especially uncomfortable
with this third element because it rocks our very sense of identity, agency, and
responsibility:
.. .not all the selves we are make you important. Some of them are quite
independent of you. Being central, being a being in the foreground, is important
to your being integrated as one responsible decision maker. Your sense of
responsibility and decision-making are tied to being able to say exactly who it is
that did what, and that person must be one and have a will in good working order.
And you are very keen on seeing yourself as a decision maker, a responsible
being: it gives you substance. (Lugones 1991, 43)
If the locus of responsibility is multiple, rather than individual and independent, and
interactive rather than originating with the unitary self, then knowledge formation,
theorizing, and "logical" thinking must be reconfigured in order to account for or contain
plurality and interactivity. Lugones maintains that many white feminist theorists hold
ideas about the unitary self that makes them fearful of plurality and unprepared to
recognize or operate within the logic of plurality and interactivity:
... you are afraid of plurality: Plurality speaks to you of a world whose logic is
unknown to you and that you inhabit unwillingly. It is a world inhabited by
beings who cannot be understood given your ordinary notions ofresponsibility,
intentionality, voluntariness, precisely because those notions presuppose that each
person is one and that each person (unless mad or in a madlike state or under
someone's power) can effectively inform her actions with preferred descriptions
that include intentionality, and do so all by herself. All other ways of being are
outside value, outside worth, outside goodness, outside intelligibility. (Lugones
1991 , 43)
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Parallel Flaws in Theorizing Subjectivity and Knowledge: White Feminism and
Paul's Idealized Thinker
Lugones' challenge to the "imperialist eye" of white feminists is a challenge that
might be made to Richard Paul and to our program. In not being able to imagine the
thinker as very different from himself (that is, beyond the experience of a formally
educated straight white male), Paul unwittingly creates a totalizing picture of critical
thinking, one that excludes many different specific identities of thinkers, and one that
does not draw from "marginalized" traditions of critical thinking that might be useful in
bringing about the kind of public critical thinking space he advocates.
Like the white feminists challenged by Anzaldua and others, Paul may be trying
to engender an educational or public thinking space where diverse frameworks may be
considered. Unfortunately, also like much of white feminist theory, Paul's over-reliance
on Western traditions of rationality and his uncomplicated portrait of the thinker in
relation to dominant frameworks of thinking undermine his goals. Though much of his
work is concerned with how we must attend to the diversity of frameworks and
assumptions that undergird all thinking, his approach nonetheless ignores political, social,
and institutionalized structures of power that have historically marked certain thinkers
and certain structures or traditions of thought as rational, normal, or natural, while
relegating others as alternative, marginal, or invisible.
Paul's unexamined reliance on Western traditions ofrational thought asks us to
cooperate in the reification of a belief in universality and objectivity which have their
roots in a white patriarchal point of view. This point of view, or framework, rather than
being universal or objective, is often a masculinist specificity or subjectivity that has been
normalized or naturalized as "common sense" or "good thinking." Common to whom?
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Good for whom? As this chapter's overview of the work of Anzaldua, Lorde, Lugones,
and Alarcon indicates, these are questions asked by critical thinkers in lesbian feminist
theory, in various critical traditions engaged in by people of color, and by working class
activists and thinkers. Such thinkers are often discounted for their very specificity, for
being too political, not objective, and therefore, not universal or sound in their thinking.
This creates a kind of circular argument, wherein, simply through the weight of
tradition and consolidated institutional power, the western rational point of view holds
sway, at least, or especially, in many institutional settings. The formation of specific
western ideas of what is rational occurs through historical processes which are hidden or
erased by "objective" interlocutors. Hence, these ideas or definitions ofrational thinking
may appear to be apolitical, transhistorical cultural norms into which those of us who are
different cannot be "seen" or must contort ourselves to fit.
Thus, we might view Paul's work not simply as an exemplar theory of critical
thinking, but as an exemplar of a tradition that conserves theories of thought and the self
that do not extend full agency, selfhood, or complexity to all people. Like our
constitution, these theories were created by specific people under specific historical and
social circumstances with certain goals in mind that did not include everyone's freedom
and dignity.
It is obvious throughout Paul's writing that one of his aims is to create, through
the teaching of better critical thinking, a more competent citizenry, and a more vibrant,
authentic democratic nation and global situation. His failure to examine or give up a
romantic, patriarchally rooted conceptualization of rationality prevents the realization of
this clearer thinking, more participatory democracy. Whether this is naivete, arrogance,
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or willful ignorance is hard to say, but it is the kind of process or belief in the possibility
of apolitical objective thinking, as well as an over-reliance on white, masculinist,
formally educated thinking, that has contributed to the exclusion of feminist and antiracist thinkers in our courses.

How Women of Color/Lesbian Feminist Discourse Could Strengthen Critical and
Creative Thinking

If the Critical and Creative Thinking Program were to use theorists like Gloria
Anzaldua, Maria Lugones, Norma Alarcon, Audre Lorde, what would we gain? On a
simple level, we would at the very least gain some diversity in our canon. Because these
women of color theorists come out of discourse communities such as women's studies,
race studies, and critical pedagogy, adding them to our course readings would increase
both our multicultural and interdisciplinary diversity.
On a more sophisticated and paradigm shifting level, these theorists bring
complexity to our understanding of the thinking subject, which in turn enhances our
understanding of what effective critical thinking is, and how we might go about fostering
such thinking in our classrooms, our communities, our selves.
In summary, these theorists bring the following elements to the critical thinking
discussion:
1. An understanding of the self as multiple, not unitary
2. An acknowledgment that difference within and among thinking selves affects
theorizing about critical thinking
3. An analysis of the ways in which power is connected to difference and to
critical thinking
4. An acute sensitivity to context and frameworks that comes from lived
experience as an outsider or a borderdweller
5. An acceptance of -- indeed, a faith in -- ambiguity as an inevitable and
productive condition of the multiple self as critical and creative thinker.
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These elements honor multiple identity, the role of power in naming difference,
and a generative ambiguity, and could thus augment Richard Paul's configuration of the
thinker. Paul's model is useful in that he gets us into the arena of multiple perspectives.
But there is a sense that ultimately, these will resolve into something more unitary,
something "rational" and "consistent," something universal which will speak to everyone,
which can be recognized as a standard. This is precisely the kind of process which leads
to the normalization and naturalization of some identities and ways of functioning as
being more valid, more universal, more authentic, than others. In maintaining
multiplicity rather than asserting or seeking the unitary self, mestiza consciousness
refuses such processes of reification. Yes, the social categories such as race, class, gender
are real to the mestiza in all their historical, institutional, and private weight and
illumination. But as Shane Phelan reminds us, such categories are not simply borne out
in simple, essentialized, or unitary ways in the mestiza person, who embodies several
indivisible identities:
The strength of mestiza consciousness is a result of its multiplicity and ability to
sustain contradiction and ambiguity, and this includes the ability to withstand
conflict and misunderstanding. The revolutionary force of the mestiza is the
ability to refuse the reifications of cultural nationalism without abandoning the
nation entirely, and to provide links to class-based movements without becoming
subsumed within them. Because she never simply "is" any one element of her
blended being, the mestiza cannot be captured in the oppositions that are
presented as inevitable; class or nature, sex or race, or any other reified
opposition. The mestiza does not dispute the historical or contemporary reality of
these designations, but she does operate constantly to undermine their unitary
solidities. (Phelan, 74-5)
Paul's construction of the strong sense thinker and his characterization of
egocentricity does not acknowledge the complications of self esteem and community
identity embodied by those not in the mainstream. This gap occurs in the writing and
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practice of many critical thinking educators who support the use of multilogical
perspectives, but fail to recognize and theorize the power dynamics that necessarily play
over thinkers, schools of thought, and the social/historical positions they occupy. Shane
Phelan, a white anti-racist lesbian feminist, contextualizes the location and power of the
mestiza in this way:
The belongingness of the mestiza for Anzaldua is not simply a matter of choice, of
voluntary affiliation, but of history and social density." (Phelan, 66-7)
Throughout his work, Paul speaks of the "thinker" in terms that do not take into
account the multiple subjectivities and socio-political positions that many people inhabit
in today's world. Because the pressures of history and social density that bear down on
the mestiza do not apply to white men (though others do), Paul can choose not to identify
his multiple identities; he can just be a normal (white) guy. He is not forced to choose
between identities, or rank them.
Paul's unspecified and unproblematized use of "I" and "we" suggest that he is
often imagining thinkers as more or less the same, that is, more or less like a straight
white man who is formally educated. Reading Paul's work, one does not get the sense of
a shifting, multiple "I" or "we" ; rather we sense he is positing a generic, universal speaker
and audience, moving us toward an ideal. This speaker, this voice, avoids or does not
reveal any particularity, but poses as objective and general. This is very different from
Anazaldua's relationship to authorial voice and audience:
The multiplicity of the mestiza is not simply internal fracture, a failure to build
and integrated personality, but is a sociohistorical reality .... This is evident in
Anzaldua's writing, in which the "WE" shifts from page-to-page, meaning
sometimes queers, sometimes Chicanos/Chicanas, sometimes feminists. Her
contextualization of this shifting "we" removes the possibility of reading her
statement as simple calls for unity, instead calling on us to acknowledge all of her
locations at once and equally. (Phelan, 66)
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Though Richard Paul champions multilogical thinking that incorporates not only
many points of view, but many frames of reference, the "we" and the "I" of his writing
seem to assume a unitary voice and a universal we. Nonetheless, a particularity informs
and shapes this voice. In other words, his voice does not match up with his theory.
Indeed, it undermines his theory in that he does not bring a multilogical perspective to the
authorial voice.
Paul believes that a strong sense critical thinker is "comfortable thinking within
multiple perspectives, in engaging in dialogical and dialectical thinking, in practicing
intellectual empathy, in thinking across disciplines and domains" (Paul, 660). While all
of these things are essential to effective critical thinking, I hope this chapter has
illustrated that the strong sense critical thinker must also cultivate the ability to feel and
examine the power dynamics that inform multiple perspectives, difference, and the
context in which thinkers and theories are created evaluated.
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CHAPTER6
MESTJZA/LESBIAN/FEMINIST OF COLOR DISCOURSE AS AN EXAMPLE
OF STRONG SENSE CRITICAL THINKING

Summarizing the Thinker: Paul's Default Unitary Self vs. the Mestiza

The thinker as mestiza illustrates how the profile of the thinker that lurks,
unproblematized, in Paul's formulation of a "strong sense" critical thinker pushes us into
the territory of identity. What we discover is that the default identity of Paul's thinker is a
person fairly supported by the status quo. Further, we see that Paul operates with a
notion of the "self' as a unitary entity, the self of Western rationality and the
enlightenment. But the experience and work of feminists/lesbians of color such as Gloria
Anzaldua, Audre Lorde, Norma Alarcon, and Maria Lugones, augmented by the work of
lesbians such as Shane Phelan and Marilyn Frye, give us a much more complicated
picture of identity and critical consciousness.
We have seen that such thinkers do not fit easily onto the grid of egocentricity and
sociocentricity as Paul configures it. Such thinkers move in and out of many identities,
thus in an out of many egocentric possibilities. Their egocentricity is multiple and
particular, not singular and universal. Nor is their identity formation, and thus their
"self," their thinking consciousness, positively formed and supported by a simple
egocentricity.
People who live in the borders, who inhabit marginalized identities, have a
complicated relationship to egocentricity and sociocentricity. Their individual identities
and social communities may be embattled or pejoratively defined in the context of
mainstream culture. They may live a complex reality of opposition to and identification
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with that mainstream culture. A further complication is that such people may have
internalized some of the negative images of themselves coming from the dominant
culture while they are at the same time resisting such malingering conceptualizations of
their identities through oppositional, self-defining practices. And yet, people in the
borderlands, on the margins, must also know and understand the ways of the dominant
cultures upon which economic and other survival may depend. If the identity of the
thinker is characterized by this kind of complexity, descriptions of and prescriptions for
strong sense critical thinking require more sophisticated theories than the simple binary
that Paul sets up in his egocentric/sociocentric formulation.

Broadening the Scope of Critical and Creative Thinking Discourse

Discourses representative of various race inflected lesbian feminist theories and
philosophies are not usually considered part of the critical and creative thinking field . I
submit that these discourses are examples of critical and creative thinking that have
evolved alongside of, or prior to, the critical and creative thinking movement. This
relative absence of lesbian feminist theories and philosophies in critical and creative
thinking is noteworthy given that these discourses might not only satisfy but render more
complex Paul's "strong sense" critical thinking criteria in that the best of them are built
upon -- indeed, arose out of -- a very real life need to examine assumptions, foreground
frames of reference, and attend to bias. (I refer you back to the Karen Warren quote that
serves as an epigraph to this thesis.)
If our program were to examine work in the areas of lesbian feminist philosophy
and theory in relation to -- and furthermore, as -- critical thinking, we could highlight the
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strengths of Richard Paul's "strong sense" critical thinking, yet question his
unproblematized characterization of the critical thinker which emerges in his discussion
of egocentric and sociocentric thinking. Paul is right in asking us to become aware of and
question prejudices -- our own biases as well as the biases of others. But, as the previous
chapters illustrate, his discussion of the process for doing so does not consider the
hierarchy of values that attaches to various points of view. Nor does he seem to consider
that critical thinkers themselves occupy varying positions of power (depending upon race,
class, and gender) which affect their relationship to egocentric and sociocentric thinking.

Theorizing Power and Difference in Critical and Creative Thinking Through the
Use of "Marginalized" Discourses

In addition, Paul does not attend to how marginalized individuals, groups, or their
theories are heard and received in traditional arenas of discourse. In a society such as
ours, in which democracy has yet to be fully realized for all citizens, difference exists on
a vertical rather than horizontal scale. In such a configuration, the "different" easily
elides into "deviant" or "deficient." So when Paul talks about bringing in many
perspectives in order to get beyond one's egocentricity or sociocentricity without
considering the value attached to those perspectives -- and the power dynamics that play
over the thinker herself -- a false flattening out occurs in his model which downplays or
conceals the authority and politics of the mainstream, while devaluing or overly
"politicizing" the perspective of the marginalized.
In comparing these "marginalized discourses" to mainstream critical and creative
thinking discourse I contend that marginalized discourses could exist within, or at the
very least, inform the critical and creative thinking canon. Examining the issue of power
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through several women of color and lesbian feminist discourses that are examples of
critical and creative thinking and that do attend to the dynamics of power helps us rethink
the critical and creative thinker as well as critical and creative thinking itself. It will
reveal the often hidden or neglected role of interactivity, community, particularity, and
emotion in the enterprise of effective, humanistic thinking. Such a focus on the multiple
subject, community, particularity, and emotion will illumine the limitations of a critical
thinking tradition overly invested in rationality, consistency, and objectivity at the
expense of the relational, paradoxical, and contextual elements that characterize the
critical and creative thinking of marginalized groups.
Marginalized groups have not traditionally enjoyed the power to decree their
experience universal, nor the entitlement to set the terms of objectivity in close match to
their subjective experience. Yet they have had to learn to live or survive within such a
paradigm and somehow reconcile its ill fit with their own experience and values. Those
who develop a critical consciousness regarding this ill fit have a lot to offer the
mainstream field of critical and creative thinking in that they have a kind of "doubleL•

seeing" or "binocular vision" that Berel Lang (1990) terms the "ironic stance of the
philosopher." Marilyn Frye complicates the notion of the philosophical "ironic stance"
by asse1iing that those of us on the margins, here specifically lesbians, operate from an
experience and consciousness that is by definition beyond the monological or egocentric
perspective that Paul cautions us to avoid (Frye 1983 ).
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The Creative as Critical in "Marginalized" Discourses

I would add that marginalized people who develop this critical perspective have
necessarily gotten there in part through a creative leap that may be nothing short of
artistic in that they have had to imagine a selfuood, full personhood, or agency not
automatically accorded them by the dominant culture. Thus, in such a field of vision, the
creative and the critical are intimately linked in ways that may not be as apparent or as
distinctive in trajectories of being/thinking that are supported by mainstream paradigms.
As Anzaldua puts it,
For many of us the acts of writing, painting, performing and filming are acts of
deliberate and desperate determination to subvert the status quo. Creative acts are
forms of political activism employing definite aesthetic strategies for resisting
dominant cultural norms and are not merely aesthetic exercises. We build culture
as we inscribe in these various forms.
Inherent in the creative act is a spiritual, psychic component--one of
spiritual excavation, of (ad)venturing into the inner void, extrapolating meaning
from it and sending it out into the world. To do this kind of work requires the
total person--body, soul, mind, and spirit. (Anzaldua 1990, xxiv)

She goes on to assert that not only does such creativity inform the critical thinking of the
mestiza, it is crucial to her very survival (Anzaldua 1990, xxiv).

If we see the identity of the thinker as not fixed but as an active process, then

these relations in turn transform identities. As Phelan suggests, rather than operating in
the world from one simple individual, essential identity, we create and inhabit many
"identity points." Understanding and working with people different from ourselves
requires building linkages between different identity groups, while at the same time we
are in part deriving our identities and communities from these linkages. This resonates
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with Anzaldua's idea that the borderdweller lives not just outside the mainstream, but in a
fecund space where many worlds collide.
Community, like individual identity, is socially constructed. It does not exist a
priori on some static transhistorical plane, but emerges out of discursive, recursive,
constitutive processes that are made up of both empowering and oppressive elements, that
are, in the clearest moments bewilderingly paradoxical, but most often contradictory and
messy.

Authentic Transformative Pedagogies -- Beyond the Universal and the Unitary Self

Our mythologies of the unitary self or the "natural" community based on race,
ethnicity, nationalism, tribes, etc., provide certain feelings of security, platforms from
which to consolidate energy and power. But they have oversimplified the conflicts
inhering in lived experience and consciousness. Their consolidating, totalizing energies
often lead to polarization, despair, xenophobia. Narratives of transcendent universality,
while appearing at first to be liberating, often flatten out specificity and diversity to a
totalizing sameness that mirrors and supports dominant paradigms. This is tantamount to

presenting just a part of evolution theory -- that of survival of the fittest -- while omitting
the part about diversity and mutability.
The unitary self and rationality that prizes consistency and closure above all else
are luxuries of privilege, a privilege not enjoyed by many Americans. The fact that these
paradigms of consciousness and thinking have persisted for so long attest not necessarily
to their validity, but to the skewed power dynamics in representation and agency that
govern private and public spheres of identity and thinking. It is a relatively recent
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phenomenon that we've even theorized that all people should have access to public
institutions such as education, and therefore, access to culturally sanctioned tools of selfrepresentation such as writing. Even today, the convergence of historical, social,
economic, racial, and gender-based factors still unjustly determine who gets what kind of
education. Basic literacy is not a given for all American citizens, nor is the definition of
"basic literacy" investigated enough to reveal the biased assumptions informing it.
Programs like ours cannot maintain that they are transformative pedagogies if
they continue to exclude the theorizing of certain kinds of thinkers, if they continue to
consolidate over-simplified or over-determined notions of what it means to be a sentient
being in today's world. We cannot foster ideas such as Howard Gardner's "multiple
intelligences" while at the same time denying the multiple subjectivities that characterize
all thinkers. Furthermore, we cannot afford to ignore the varying degrees of power and
agency that inform the institutional and personal intersections of race, class, gender,
ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc., that comprise such multiple subjectivities. By not
attending to the cultural and social circumstances and the lived experience of thinkers in
the world (and thus the power, oppression, and empowerment that is employed in such
circumstances and experiences) we fall into the chasm of a kind of mind/body split.
In describing the consciousness and perspective, the thinking and maneuvering
required of people who understand their multiple identitied selves in a culture that marks
all or some of their identities as "other" or "minority" or "marginal," writers such as
Anzaldua, Larde, Alarcon, and Lugones help us create a more complex profile of a
thinker than Paul provides in his work.
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Redefining Critical Thinking Through Mestiza and Lesbian Feminist Discourse

Viewing the world as a mestiza, as Anzaldua does, or as a lesbian feminist, as do
Frye and Phelan, forces us to rethink the definition of what good critical thinking is. It
forces us to abandon rigid notions of consistency. It makes us suspicious of universal
claims. It means we must entertain the importance of the subconscious, as well as the
rational. It gives creativity a larger role in good thinking, and makes it less easy to divide
critical from creative thinking. Imagining the thinker in terms of non-mainstream
multiple identities may help us to see that thinking and education cannot be separated
from everyday life, from cornnmnity, from context. The thinker who inhabits a mestiza
consciousness demonstrates the ways in which thinking and feeling are connected; the

mestiza helps us to see that empathy is necessary to powerful thinking.

Navigating Power and Multiple Subjectivities: Plural Rather Than Objective
Participation in Thinking

Imagining the thinker in the way Anzaldua, Lorde, Alarcon, and Lugones do
means that actual lived experience of the thinker cannot be separated out from sociopolitical, cultural reality. Thus, thinking cannot be separated from issues of power. The
issue then becomes not how to we divest thinking of partiality, subjectivity, and power,
but rather how do we navigate all these subjectivities in a way that is useful and
empowering to all citizens. How may we create plural (rather than objective)
participation in thinking that creates democratic possibility rather than oppressive
institutions and situations.
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Moving beyond Paul's consistent, unitary, resolved self kind of thinker to a
thinker more like Anzaldua's mestiza figure gives us the opportunity to learn a variety of
strategies for dealing with problems that require supple, sinewy thinking. This less static,
multiple subjectivity of the thinker may offer less psychic certainty, less security, than the
notion of the universal, rational thinker. But we must ask ourselves, who has been served
by belief in the unitary self, by universal notions of consistency and rationality as the
supreme marks of good thinking? Reliance on objectivity has appealed to whom? What
are the subjective identities that have informed objective ideals and then been erased in
the masquerade of "universal"? Who has had privilege enough in their material lives to
believe in the illusion of security?
Anzaldua and countless others demonstrate that not only does the thinker inhabit
multiple subjectivites, but that context, historical, political and institutional processes
imbue various subjectivities with different power relations. Attending to this view of the
thinker may be more anxiety producing than romantic Western notions of the universal
individual thinker as a self-contained, rational unit able to transcend historical, temporal,
institutional processes of domination and power. Yet understanding the multiple, unfixed
nature of the thinker and her many-layered context can yield more flexible, adaptable,
mobile, and humble thinking (regarding flexibility and adaptability, it may be argued that
these traits have been at least as useful as consistency in the survival and evolution of our
species).
Paul's portrait of the thinker, and his definition of good thinking, under-represents
women, people of color, queers, poor and working-class people. Furthermore, it ignores
important paradigm-shifting discourses, such as feminism, lesbian-feminism,
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postmodemism, critical theory, and the outpouring of critical thinking on race and
multiculturalism. These various discourses not only question an array of assumptions and
frameworks that Paul ignores, they also place education and thinking within the context
of socio-political frameworks in which the role of power must be considered.

Redefining Critical and Creative Thinking: Toward a New Vision of Power

In the foregoing discussion I have contemplated the limits of a traditionally
Western concept of good thinking that is characterized by an ahistorical, deculturized
rationality; individual or isolated reflection; neutrality; universality; consistency; and a
belief in the unitary self. Through Anzaldua's mestiza figure, I have particularized the
critical and creative thinker as other than straight/white/male/academic, thus
demonstrating how the elements of feeling (particularly empathy), intersubjectivity, lived
experience, oppression and radical consciousness might play a vital role in the
development of a person's critical and creative thinking abilities. Studying Anzaldua's
work, along with related projects and discourses of lesbian-feminist and feminist of color
theory, as examples of critical and creative thought, serves to not only contextualize these
discourses within critical and creative thinking, but also to redefine critical and creative
thinking and add to it the dimension of power that, whether we recognize it or not,
informs all social endeavors.
A hope for the future is that such a redefining move might in tum help us to
redefine power. What I envision is really a paradigm shift, in which we come to think of
power as internal empowerment gained through self-actualization in the development of
critical and creative thinking, rather than simply accepting the notion of power as
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something outside of ourselves, something to be fought for, hoarded, and deployed over
or on each other in destructive, fragmenting ways that foreclose the community
formation, or more pointedly, the communion necessary to the realization of true
democracy .
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